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ABSTRACT 
Critical-Incident Response:  
A Study of Training, Management & Mitigation in  
North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices 
 
by 
Gregory A. Minton 
 
The purpose of this study was to determine the amount of training each sheriff’s office requires 
in North Carolina and if that training includes multiagency exercises designed to mitigate a 
critical-incident response and identify any concerns from those training events. The study also 
compared departmental strength (number of sworn officers per agency) with county populations 
and geographic area of the state the agency is located in with the number of hours required 
annually by each agency. Finally, each agency was asked if it had participated in a multiagency 
exercise and a multiagency incident and to identify any issues that occurred within that training 
or response. 
 
This research indicated that over half of the sheriffs’ offices had completed mandated training 
beyond what North Carolina requires. Only slight differences between regions of the state 
(mountains, piedmont, or coastal plain) were detected as well as slight differences within the 
county populations. However, it was discovered that the size of a sheriff’s office did have 
significance; larger sheriff’s offices often required more training than smaller offices. Sheriff’s 
offices that had experienced multiagency exercises and multiagency incidents were more likely 
to exceed the North Carolina minimum training requirements as well. Finally, respondents who 
had participated in either a multiagency exercise or a multiagency incident indicated common 
problems and concerns within those responses. The reoccurring problems and concerns were; 
communications, training, and organization or combinations of the three.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The events of September 11, 2001, truly did change every aspect of American lives 
(September 11 news, 2001-2008) & (MSNBC News, 2006). Immediately after the attacks, 
several positive changes were observed – for example, larger blood bank donations (Parlikar, 
2003) and greater recognition for firefighters and rescue workers (Walker, 2001) . Attorney 
General John Ashcroft led a series of legislative reforms that directly impacted law enforcement 
and the rules surrounding how law enforcement and the federal government in general can 
combat terrorism (Lithwick & Turner, 2003).  Most of those amendments were collapsed into the 
Patriot Act (US Patriot Act H.R. 3162, 2001) legislation that has been the lightning rod for 
heated debate or over whether the Bush administration went too far in its attempts to save the 
country from another 9/11-caliber event (Vlahos, 2003).  
There is one concrete manner in which law enforcement has improved in recent years, 
especially since the tragedy of 9/11, and this improvement has continued well beyond the initial 
attacks (Chapman & Scheider, 2002). Currently, local, state, and federal law enforcement 
agencies, more than at any other time in history, work together with their fellow branches on 
every level: training, information gathering, action, and postmortem analysis of a critical-
incident.  Possible solutions for better collaboration between agencies are absolutely essential in 
determining the correct future paths of law enforcement and incident management agencies. 
Furthermore, they are critical in determining what more needs to be done by national, state, and 
local agencies to safeguard America from manmade and natural disasters for the decades to 
come (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  
The lack of cooperation and historical patterns of territorialism have been addressed 
within the United States intelligence organizations.  Shortly after 9/11, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and many other 
organizations became controlled by one “terrorism czar” (Posner, 2006, ¶ 9). The challenges that 
these organizations face in integrating their practices, subverting their leaders’ individual egos, 
and training their multitude of forces and employees are echoed in the challenges that law 
enforcement and incident management agencies will face in the coming years with regard to 
their own costly and complicated integration (Posner, 2006,). 
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Possible solutions to managing an all-hazards event (natural or manmade) are absolutely 
integral in determining the correct actions various law enforcement and incident management 
agencies will use in future events; furthermore, they are critical in identifying what steps should 
be taken by national, state, and local agencies to safeguard the United States homeland from 
other disasters for the decades to come (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
America, 2004). In 2007 Congress appropriated funding for law enforcement and incident 
management cooperation; it was up to individual agencies to implement programs to assist in 
mitigation of terrorist acts (Antiterrorism and Emergency Assistance Program, 2008). 
 With regard to both incident cooperation and training, several initiatives have been put 
into place to facilitate better cooperation between various facets and arms of law enforcement in 
the United States.  For instance, the Incident Command System (Incident Management Team, 
2008) and the National Incident Management System  (NIMS Training, 2008)  are two protocols 
by which various agencies with law enforcement, rescue, and fire personnel work together to 
prevent a cataclysmic event from taking place and, if such an event does take place, to minimize 
the damage. 
 With budget cuts in some areas and budget booms in others plus priority given by federal 
legislators to biochemical warfare protection versus more ordinary local law enforcement (Grant 
Writing USA, 2007), the concept of cooperation is diluted and is rendered much more 
exasperating. There is very little direction as to which agencies supersede other agencies and also 
which priorities within particular agencies supersede others.  In essence, incident managers must 
consider the practical takeaways – not only the macro-level policy determinations – associated 
with the Incident Command System (ICS) and the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1998).  Indeed, to draw the analysis 
down to the lowest common denominator, local law enforcement agencies benefit from the new 
cross-training initiatives and cooperation with national and state agencies (Freudenthal, 2005) 
Incident Managers are unclear as to how to maximize benefits and utilities from these new 
allocations and programs. Furthermore, postincident analysis (FEMA ICS100.a, 2009, ¶ 2) has 
identified a few major concerns that if not resolved could hamper or cripple the mediation 
process.  
Consequently, research concerning the current level of integration in both incident 
management and incident prevention, along with cooperation in training, must be performed in 
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order to paint an adequate picture of where the baseline is now (Burgie, 2009) and more 
importantly, where law enforcement should have been concentrating training efforts 
(Muhlhausen, 2002).  
According to Cole (2000) the historical model of Incident Command has its basis within 
the fire service. He also notes that migration into nation-wide local law enforcement agencies for 
wide scale acceptance and implementation has been problematic. North Carolina in 2008-2009 
mandated only 24 hours of in-service training per certified officer (North Carolina Criminal 
Justice and Sheriffs’. Mandated In-Service Training, 2008). Not one of the required training 
topics addresses Incident Command, Incident Management or the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS). This specialized training is left up to individual law enforcement entities having 
to comply with Homeland Security Presidential Directive /HSPD-5 (HSPD-5, 2003). To assist 
with compliance to this directive, specific federal funding initiatives are withheld until units have 
been met or exceeded the requirement (FEMA, 2007). The certification procedure is quite simple 
because all training is provided through an on-line access with FEMA Emergency Management 
Institute or delivered by certified instructors in a web blended class environment (FEMA, 2008). 
 
Statement of the Problem 
  
This researcher seeks to determine the extent to which various local law enforcement 
agencies work together on cross-training projects primarily within neighboring local 
jurisdictions’ response to critical-incidents. The goals of this research are 1) to identify the 
dynamics that interplay between agency cooperation in incident management and law 
enforcement; 2) to determine what is being done to enhance the public’s security; 3) to determine 
what is not being done; and 4) to address recommendations for the future via data analysis and 
the presentation of the findings for future cooperation, cross-training efforts and future grant 
applications designed to mitigate the cost of implementation of such a program.  
Since 9/11 there has been considerable discussion among first-responder agencies and 
cross-training with other agencies outside their specific disciplines; however, there are no 
standards, mandates, or regulations in place that require agencies to engage in first-responder 
cross-training events. 
 
10 
 
Research Questions 
 
This study examines the extent to which cooperation and training exists to address major 
incidents involving multiple-disciplinary critical-response agencies with sheriffs’ offices in 
North Carolina. The following six questions served as a research guide for this study: 
 
1. Do North Carolina sheriffs’ offices complete more training than the North Carolina 
Sheriffs’ Training & Standards Division require? 
2. Are any differences in training related to agency size, region of the state, or county 
size in requiring additional departmentally mandated training hours?   
3. Is there a difference between agencies that have had a multiagency exercise and 
increased training hour requirement and agencies that meet only North Carolina 
training minimums and had not participated in a multiagency exercise?  
4. Is there a difference between agencies that have experienced a multiagency response 
incident with increased training hour requirement and agencies that have met only 
North Carolina training minimums and had not experienced a multiagency response?  
5. For the agencies that participated in an annual multiagency critical-incident exercise, 
what problems were identified within those exercises?  
6. For agencies that experienced a multiagency critical-incident, what were problems 
encountered within during responses? 
   
Significance of the Study 
 
 This study should provide both historical assessment of local agencies use and nonuse of 
the Incident Command System or variations of those organizational elements specified within 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Analysis of the reported problems should 
lead to recommendations for the future of critical-incident management as it pertains to law 
enforcement roles and responsibilities when responding to and managing incidents. 
Researchers should be able to use this study as a baseline when developing micro-policy 
measures to dictate how cross-training within the National Incident Management System and 
Incident Management System should proceed.  The significance is that the same number of 
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resources and the same degree of funding will result in a more efficient law enforcement and 
critical-incident management environment, which will in turn manifest a safer public and 
stronger homeland security. Local law enforcement and first responders will be able to look to 
the findings from this research as a tangible guide for this new era of cooperation and cross-
training. 
 
Definitions of Terms 
 
FIRESCOPE- Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential 
Emergencies. A management design for critical-incidents. The result of the 1970 wild land fires 
in southern California. Major participating agencies included the Forest Service of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, California Department of Forestry, California Office of Emergency 
Management and the fire departments of Los Angeles City and the Counties of Los Angeles, 
Santa Barbara, and Ventura (Chase, 1980). 
 
Incident Command System (ICS)- a set of personnel, policies, procedures, facilities, and 
equipment, integrated into a common organizational structure designed to improve emergency 
response operations of all types and complexities (FEMA IS100.a, 2009). 
 
Interoperable Communications- the ability to communicate will all federal, state, and local 
responders during a specific incident or event (EHS Today, 2010). 
 
National Contingency Plan (NCP)The first National Contingency Plan was developed and 
published in 1968 in response to a massive oil spill from the oil tanker Torrey Canyon off the 
coast of England the year before. More than 37 million gallons of crude oil spilled into the water, 
causing massive environmental damage. To avoid the problems faced by response officials 
involved in this incident, U.S. officials developed a coordinated approach to cope with potential 
spills in U.S. waters. The 1968 plan provided the first comprehensive system of accident 
reporting, spill containment, and cleanup, and established a response headquarters, a national 
reaction team, and regional reaction teams (precursors to the current National Response Team 
and Regional Response Teams) United States Environmental Protection Agency (2010). 
 
National Incident Command System (NIMS)- NIMS incorporates incident management best 
practices developed and proven by thousands of responders and authorities across America. 
These practices, coupled with consistency and national standardization, will now be carried 
forward throughout all incident management processes: exercises, qualification and certification, 
communications interoperability, doctrinal changes, training, and publications, public affairs, 
equipping, evaluating, and incident management. All of these measures unify the response 
community as never before (FEMA IS700.a, 2009). 
 
National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS)- First major revision of the ICS 
model (1981-82) adapting ICS to an “all hazards” approach. NIIMS is comprised of five major 
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subgroups, incident command system, training, certification and qualifications, publication 
management, supporting technology (Integrated Publishing, 2009) 
 
Unified Command (UC)- UC is a structure that brings together the "Incident Commanders" of all 
major organizations involved in the incident in order to coordinate an effective response while at 
the same time carrying out their own jurisdictional responsibilities. The UC links the 
organizations responding to the incident and provides a forum for these entities to make 
consensus decisions. Under the UC, the various jurisdictions and/or agencies and non-
government responders may blend together throughout the operation to create an integrated 
response team (Unified Command, 2008).  
 
 
Delimitations and limitations 
 
The limitations of this study are typical of those that employ surveys. The data gathered 
are only as accurate as the respondents’ knowledge of local training requirements and current 
issues concerning critical-incident management and the respondents’ willingness to accurately 
share the information. 
The study is delimited to the 100 sheriff’s offices in North Carolina. 
 
Organization of the Study 
 
This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 includes an introduction, statement 
of the problem, research questions, significance of the study, definitions of terms, and 
delimitations and limitations. Chapter 2 is a review of the literature of incident management and 
critical response debriefs and findings. Chapter 3 describes the methodology and procedures that 
were used for the survey. Chapter 4 is a presentation of the data gathered. Chapter 5 is a 
summary of the findings from data analysis and recommendations for future research and to 
improve practice.   
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
This literature review presents the history, evolution, and current mandates of critical-
incident management as it relates to local and state governments. The analysis examines past 
implementation and needs identified from those events. Additional literature is reviewed to stress 
prior deficiencies identified and their recommendations for mitigation strategies in future use. 
 
Incident Command System: The Beginning 
  
One of the most widely recognized ways in which various national, state, and local 
agencies cooperate and mitigate emergencies is through the Incident Command System (ICS) 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000).  In response to the devastating 1970 brushfire season in 
southern California, one of the worst in American history, a group of local, state, and federal fire 
agencies developed the Incident Command System (ICS) (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000, 
p.11). The consortium, called FIRESCOPE, sought to design a procedure to facilitate the smooth 
connection and linkage of multiple agencies to respond effectively to sudden overwhelming 
threats (Center for Disease Control, 2004). Cardwell and Cooney (2000) stated; 
Neither the birth of ICS among Southern California's wildland fire agencies nor its slow 
adoption and internalization by law enforcement is surprising. Fire agencies in Southern 
California face unique challenges every summer when hot, dry “Santa Ana” winds render 
management of vegetation fires in foothill communities nearly impossible (p.11). 
  
With the possibility of loss of life and extreme costs in property damage from these 
incidents, it is natural that a very efficient interagency emergency response system came into 
being (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Seven fire agencies initially developed what is known as the 
Incident Command System (ICS) in 1972 (Cole, 2000).  However, it was not until 1984 and the 
summer Olympics that were held in Los Angeles did ICS practices begin to be adopted within 
law enforcement (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Some local critical-incident management 
agencies across the nation, including both law enforcement and fire fighting, discovered ICS 
through their communication and working relationship with the U.S. Forest Service, which had 
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been one of the original FIRESCOPE participants and held a major responsibility in the initial 
development of ICS shortly after the 1970 California wildfires (Irwin, 2000).   
The United States policy on managing critical-incidents involving terrorism has evolved 
significantly in the last 38 years. In 1972 the National Contingency Plan (NCP) was amended to 
include oil spills and hazardous material releases. The NCP was the initial approach to mandate 
multiple agencies, teams, and individuals from federal, state, and local governments and private 
organizations to focus all their response activities on the mitigation of a specific incident 
(USGAO, 1997, p.17).   In 1985 recommendations were made following the Vice-President’s 
Task Force on Terrorism. The task force stressed the need for improved centralized interagency 
coordination of the federal government’s significant assets to respond to terrorist incidents 
(USGAO, 1997, p.17). This recommendation was targeted at global incidents; however, it also 
assigned a National Security Council (NSC) group to coordinate a national response and 
identified the primary federal agencies responsibilities overseas and within the U.S. The State 
Department was delegated as the lead agency for international terrorism policy, procedures and 
programs, and the FBI was assigned as the lead agency for managing acts of domestic terrorism. 
In 1986 President Ronald Reagan formalized the task force’s recommendations into National 
Security Decision Directive 207 (USGAO, 1997, p.17).    
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act was signed into 
law on November 23, 1988. The act established a statutory authority for a federal response in the 
event of a disaster or other emergency declared by the President. It places the initial response on 
the shoulders of each state. If the incident required federal resources, those would be 
immediately assigned by the President, but in most incidents the state would be responsible for 
crisis management and as the incident stabilized the state would be responsible for consequence 
management as well. If any state encounters difficultly at any point the state could request 
specific assets from the federal government under the Federal Response Plan (USGAO, 1997, 
p.58). The Stafford Act identifies FEMA as the lead agency for consequence management as 
well as giving FEMA the authority to assign missions to any federal resource with the approval 
of the President. 
In 1995 Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39) was signed. This directive 
expanded the federal response and established a “national policy, a strategy, and an interagency 
coordination mechanism and management structure to combat terrorism” (USGAO, 1997, p.17).   
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Three specific federal priorities were established to counter acts of terrorism (1) prevent and 
deter terrorism; (2) respond to terrorist threats or incidents; and (3) manage the consequences of 
a terrorist act. PDD 39 also delegated the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as 
the lead agency in charge of consequence management, the aftermath of an incident, and the 
maintenance of the Federal Response Plan (USGAO, 1997).   PDD-39 also gives the FBI a 
mandate to engage in pre incident developing, prioritizing, and dissemination of processed 
intelligence to other federal, state, and local entities to “eliminate the threat by recovering and 
neutralizing any devices and apprehending perpetrators”. This intelligence must be legally 
obtained and distributed to all authorized member agencies (Rohen, 2001, ¶ 26). 
The National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) adopted the concept 
that has now been adopted in many fire agencies coast-to-coast, as well as in a few nonfire 
agencies, most importantly and famously the Coast Guard (United States Coast Guard, 2000). 
The Coast Guard became the first national organization to integrate ICS policy within its core 
response protocol.  
ICS adoption continued to spread nationwide. Indeed, the National Fire Academy, which 
is administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, teaches the concept of ICS 
collaboration and both the National Fire Protection Association and the National Wildfire 
Coordinating Group employ ICS. ICS has also received much legislative backing, for instance 
California (California Code, 2003) and New York State Emergency Management (Integrated 
Publishing, 2009) mandate ICS’s use by all disciplines of local and state emergency response 
groups. 
Prior to 9/11 law enforcement generally did not face emergencies of such enormous 
scale; police agencies seldom had to provide such extensive assistance to one another. Most 
incidents were mitigated locally or required minor response from neighboring law enforcement 
agencies (FEMA IS700a, 2009). Consequently, many law enforcement managers understandably 
viewed their emergency response systems, often developed in isolation from one another, as 
effective (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Since 9/11 emergency management has changed, law 
enforcement has been thrown into the very forefront of the concept of the survival of America, as 
was established during the 2001 terrorist attacks.  Now, law enforcement agencies are joining 
their fire department critical-incident management colleagues in implementing the ICS concepts. 
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These changes started well before the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  For instance, the 1984 Los 
Angeles Olympics (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000)  and subsequent major events that last beyond 
one operational cycle (8-12 hours). Incidents are unplanned responses first responders must 
manage while events are planned actions or training sessions well before incidents occur. Either 
predicted or spontaneous, these responses forced cutting-edge law enforcement managers to seek 
better ways to integrate not only allied police agencies but also other genres of agencies such as 
fire and emergency medical services at the moment and place of any type of safety crisis or even 
potential safety crisis, as in the Los Angeles Olympics case (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000). As 
Cardwell and Cooney commented: 
While an individual agency's protocols and procedures may have worked well for years in 
a vacuum, the need for some standardization quickly becomes apparent when agencies 
must integrate their resources rapidly during the response to a major incident. It is no 
longer sufficient for an agency to develop and maintain a locally successful emergency 
response plan; such plans also must be compatible with those of surrounding jurisdictions 
and other disciplines, as well (p.1). 
 
This necessary realization was present one hot day in Oakland, California in 1991. In a 
few hours, the Tunnel Fire in the East Bay Hills destroyed 3,000 homes and took the lives of a 
police officer, a firefighter, and 25 civilians (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000).  Before 9/11 the 
Tunnel Fire was one of the most critical-incidents that had required management resources from 
both the fire and law enforcement disciplines to act in concert. The losses to all of the Oakland 
responders and all of the assisting units were completely devastating.  However, much more 
terrible were the losses of life within the communities in the surrounding areas and in the 
infrastructure. Cardwell and Clooney (2000) observed in their research that the development of a 
cohesive management collaboration was literally hours behind the rapidly expanding fire zone 
and the escalating damage.  
Simply put, fire departments, law enforcement agencies, municipal water department 
representatives, emergency medical services personnel, and other public safety agencies could 
not implement and collaborate their efforts in time to noticeably limit the destruction of the fire 
(Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). According to the authors,  
The 1991 Oakland disaster was not just a fire problem. Law enforcement, public works 
and utilities, the National Guard, health and safety services, and relief agencies 
encountered crushing difficulties. None of these organizations shared a common 
organizational system or compatible command structure. The Tunnel Fire pointed out the 
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need for a common emergency management system throughout local and state 
government for use by all agencies with a first-responder role associated with public 
safety (p.1). 
 
Consequently, in 1993 California enacted legislation establishing the Standardized Emergency 
Management System and mandating the use of FIRESCOPE (NIIMS) ICS for disaster 
management (California Code, 2003). 
The Oakland situation underscored the urgency of the need for national standardization.  
As the rapid movement of large numbers of emergency response resources around the nation has 
become more commonplace, a nationally standardized interdisciplinary emergency management 
system has in turn become absolutely essential according to the United States Department of 
Agriculture Fire Service (United States Department of Agriculture, 2002). The heightened 
possibility that terrorists might any day use weapons of mass destruction on American soil has 
made the necessity of quickly and efficiently integrating multidisciplinary resources and units 
from local, state, and federal agencies unprecedented (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). That is why 
emergency planners across the country have to determine not only which system to use as the 
standard but also how much deviation from that standard is acceptable by various agencies, 
especially by local law enforcement departments and local critical-incident management groups 
(Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Without a doubt, law enforcement leaders must be able to change 
any management procedure to adjust to local, operational, and political complications. However, 
when any standard system changes significantly, it loses its value as a mechanism that could be 
used to integrate dissimilar agencies with the least amount of confusion and uncertainty 
(Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). 
In 1999 individuals from various state and local emergency response communities wrote 
the U.S. Attorney General concerning possible “command-and-control” conflicts that could arise 
when various levels of government employed their own management style while training for a 
hypothetical Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) exercise. The National Domestic 
Preparedness Office (NDPO) was assigned to find a solution to this problem (Rohen, 2001). 
Representatives from the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the FEMA National Fire Academy and the NDPO were the 
primary members of this task-force. The group’s findings were focused on coordination, incident 
site operations, terminology, and training for the first responder community (Rohen, 2001). The 
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group recommended and designed specific protocols that would function within existing state 
and local response procedures allowing federal assets to function within local or state controlled 
incidents. These new protocols were tested in previously scheduled multiagency response 
exercises through FEMA’s National Fire Academy. Debriefings held after training indicated 
federal responses and mandates could function within existing state and local ICS protocols 
(Rohen, 2001).  
The FBI established the FBI Joint-Operations-Center (FBI-JOC) to integrate and enhance 
local or state government’s response to a terrorist incident (Rohen, 2001). To manage ongoing 
incidents one must consider assets each has to offer. The problem of all responders integrating 
into an existing crisis is difficult at best, Rohen (2001) focused on the need for all responders to 
be knowledgeable of each agencies functions, strengths, responsibilities, and limitations to lessen 
the amount of confusion between agencies responding to an event or incident. 
Many agencies have made numerous modifications to the existing ICS model but have 
retained the Incident Command System title. Truly, the organizational and operational reports of 
some agencies implementing these modifications resemble the original FIRESCOPE model in 
title alone (Center for Disease Control, 2004). Additionally, issues and conflicts during some 
emergencies have demonstrated that fundamental ICS management concepts either were 
completely absent or were functioning improperly. Therefore, in order to circumvent such 
problems, agencies on the national, state, and local level should follow the basic Incident 
Command System design and structure (NIMS Training, 2008). Typically, there exist eight basic 
management concepts in the Incident Command System -- modular organization, unified 
command, manageable span-of-control, common terminology, consolidated action plans, 
comprehensive resource management, integrated communications, and predesignated incident 
facilities (SARBC, 2003). Use of these basic principles in concert contributes to the success of 
the Incident Command System. 
 
Modular Organization 
ICS divides organizational duties into five distinct areas: command, operations, planning, 
logistics, and finance or administration, with each section subdivided to address various specific 
tasks. This basic collaborative idea remains integral to ICS. Emergency response plans that do 
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not incorporate this standardized five-part organization are not ICS, regardless of their titles 
(Cardwell & Cooney, 2000). 
The modular building blocks of ICS allow the organization to grow quickly as the 
response to an incident grows and to shrink back down as the danger or emergency recedes. 
Only needed components of the ICS organization are actually staffed, pursuant to the type and 
scope of the incident. It is only an event like 9/11 that would see full staffing according to 
Cardwell and other experts. Only in the largest and most complex field operations would the full 
ICS organization and collaboration be fully staffed (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000). 
 
Unified Command 
Few large emergent incidents involve only one agency; most are multidisciplinary and 
even multijurisdictional. The inherent ability for multiple agencies from multiple jurisdictions to 
collaborate their work for the public good while keeping their autonomy, authority, and 
jurisdiction represents one of the most important benefits of ICS (White, 2006). 
 
According to Cardwell and Clooney (2000); 
 
Under the unified command concept, each organization that has legal jurisdiction over a 
significant portion of an incident can participate in the command structure. ICS provides 
a separate interface for assisting or mutual-aid agencies that have no legal responsibility. 
Therefore, representation in a unified command depends on the location of the incident 
(whose turf is involved) and the nature of the incident (which disciplines are necessary to 
resolve the problem) (p. 2). 
 
Manageable Span-of-Control 
Integral to the correct implementation of modular organization, this concept of 
manageable span-of-control acts as a means to avoid overwhelming any one person with so 
many duties and so much pressure that effectiveness slows (911 Dispatch, 2007). Current 
established ICS guidelines for span-of-control range from 1:3 to 1:7, with 1:5 being the norm 
(Cardwell & Cooney, 2000). 
As the organization develops for any given emergent situation, managers must 
continually expand the span-of-control by shared duties and assign additional personnel and staff 
as needed to promulgate an efficiently supervised collaborative group. Similarly, as an incident 
recedes, managers must consolidate responsibility and get rid of positions as they become 
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redundant or flat-out obsolete, promptly demobilizing parts of the organization no longer 
necessary (911 Dispatch, 2000). 
 
Common Terminology 
The ability to communicate effectively with one another is fundamental to any successful 
collaborative project or response. The need to work with unfamiliar people and organizations 
combined with the stress of an unexpected incident strains even the most effective 
communication. ICS solves this problem by providing certain common definitions of 
organizational functions, resources, and facilities. (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000) Similarly, 
personnel must communicate in "clear text," by bypassing codes, acronyms, and other jargon not 
comprehended by all concerned. 
 
Consolidated Action Plans 
Every incident requires some sort of an action plan. Needless to say, complex incidents 
of long duration necessitate more elaborate planning. ICS hands down a formulaic planning 
schema by which managers develop “laundry lists” of both tactical objectives and available 
resources, prioritize the goals, and then assign resources to achieve each objective in order of its 
established importance (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000). 
When the available resources are depleted, managers must decide whether to order 
additional resources or allow low-priority objectives to suffer. That is where consolidated action 
planning enters the picture.  Consolidated action planning considers not just the tactical 
objectives but the logistical necessities of the ICS organization. In a single command, goals and 
strategies enmeshed in the action plan should competently address the policies and priorities of 
each agency sharing legal jurisdiction over the emergency. (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000) 
In Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5, 2003), President Bush called on 
the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a national incident-management system to 
provide a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, tribal, and local governments to work 
together to prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of 
cause, size, or complexity. On March 1, 2004, after close collaboration with state and local 
government officials and representatives from a wide range of public safety organizations, 
Homeland Security issued the National Incident Management System (NIMS). It incorporates 
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many existing best practices into a comprehensive national approach to domestic incident 
management, applicable at all jurisdictional levels and across all functional disciplines.  
The NIMS system represents a core set of doctrine, principles, terminology, and 
organizational processes to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management at 
all levels. To provide the framework for interoperability and compatibility, the NIMS concept is 
based on a balance between flexibility and standardization. The recommendations of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission") 
further highlight the importance of ICS. The Commission's recent report recommends national 
adoption of the ICS to enhance command, control, and communications capabilities (HSPD-5, 
2003). 
 
Comprehensive Resource Management 
Efficient resource management is perhaps the cornerstone of the ICS innovations. 
Efficient resource management is achieved by implementing “standardized terms and definitions 
(common terminology), using a mandatory initial check-in procedure, tracking the status of each 
resource, and promptly reporting changes in resource status” (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000, p. 3). 
The staff tracks the status of each resource after initial check-in and logs it as either 
"assigned" (already assigned a task), "available" (ready and waiting for an assignment), or "out 
of service" (not assigned and not available, such as a vehicle that needs repair or personnel who 
must rest) (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000, p.3). Because time represents a huge frustration for 
critical-incident workers, the chance to accurately assess what resources are at bay and put them 
to use without significant delay constitutes a major benefit of ICS. 
While many organizations may do this well, standardization of the process will facilitate 
interagency coordination when an emergency arises, stated Cardwell and Cooney in their study 
(2000). 
 
Integrated Communications 
Prior planning is more essential for integrated communications than for any other ICS 
management idea. Coordination of frequency-sharing agreements, acquisition of compatible 
radio hardware, and even installation of extra telephone lines and emergency power generators 
represent just some of the bridges that agencies may have to cross to accomplish key inter- and 
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intra-organizational communication during a critical-incident (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000).  The 
significance of responders using common terminology cannot be overstated. Multiple agencies 
responding to a mass event must use clear, well defined language common to all. Joint Standard 
Operation Procedures should be addressed and accepted prior to any incident (Cardwell & 
Cooney, 2000). 
 
Predesignated Incident Facilities 
This final ICS management idea suggests identifying locations and facilities before 
critical-incidents strike that will allow the myriad agencies to use for many of the standardized 
ICS organizational functions. Common ICS terminology defines such incident facilities as an 
incident command post, incident base, staging areas, helibases, and other locations (Cardwell & 
Cooney, 2000). If needed, agencies must establish agreements to use convenient buildings, as 
well as determine methods of contacting responsible parties, obtaining keys, and even 
positioning supplies, prior to an actual critical-incident that needs to be managed. 
The proper use of these eight ICS management concepts has assisted in the growth of 
ICS (Emergency Management Program Concepts, 2005). Primarily because of its adoption by 
the U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, and U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, ICS has proven successful during incidents as diverse as wildland fires, floods, 
volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, hazardous materials incidents, multi-casualty accidents, the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, and several airplane crashes such as the one that befell Queens right after the 
terrorist attacks in 2001 (Terrorism Incident Annex, 2008). Agencies also have employed ICS 
for the successful resolution of numerous planned events such as political conventions, 
championship professional sports events, and visiting dignitaries (Incident Management Team, 
2008).  
The relationship that ICS management teams have with nonusers of ICS is also critical to 
the structure’s success.  As Cardwell and Cooney (2000) noted, the system retains its usefulness, 
even when working with agencies that have not embraced ICS. Specifically, for example, 
contingency plans for response to a terrorist incident in California include the immediate 
assimilation of the ranking on-scene Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Agent into the 
unified command process. 
23 
 
Although the FBI represents the primary and managing federal agency during the crisis 
phase of the response, local agencies still must respond effectively with local resources, likely 
unassisted, for the first several critical hours. (United States Policy on Counterterrorism, 1995)  
Nonetheless, agencies should immerse FBI supervisors in the unified command as early as 
possible, primarily because of existing terrorism laws being United States Code violations. There 
are many responders who believed the establishment of an FBI Joint Operations Center (JOC) 
was designed to override existing local or state controlled incidents and take primary command 
of the situation; however, this is not the case, the FBI is not in charge of lifesaving functions 
associated with a major incident (Rohen, 2001). These functions must be managed mostly by 
local resources with local personnel governed by local government. Any Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) or terrorist incident will involve a multiagency response with authorities 
from all agencies wondering “who’s in charge?’ Unity of command must be dealt with prior to 
the incident occurring  
Once the brunt of FBI manpower and resources begin to arrive and the FBI establishes a 
command post (historically dividing the FBI's response into command, operations, and support 
groups), the resulting collaboration with the local agencies’ incident command post would 
include colocation and exchanging counterparts in absolutely critical management positions 
(Blitzer, 1997). 
In this manner, state and local departments would continue to assist in the situation while 
accommodating the FBI's traditional command post and joint operations center structure 
(Cardwell & Cooney, 2000).  Agencies from various jurisdictions should continue to seek to 
develop similar arrangements with other federal agencies that do not yet use ICS, such as the 
National Transportation Safety Board during the response to transportation accidents. 
As noted earlier, 9/11 has changed everything, especially with regard to the ICS 
management of critical-incidents System (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000).  Terrorist 
attacks, transportation accidents, natural disasters, and political and sporting events bring unseen 
burdens to public safety agencies, today more than ever in America’s history. As a result, these 
incidents can cause agencies to flounder or succeed based on the amount of preparedness and 
cooperation among the various entities called upon to deal with such pressing and often 
unpredictable crises.  
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For over 30 years many emergency response agencies – federal, state, and local -- have 
turned to the Incident Command System to assist them in establishing a cooperative effort that 
can process critical situations (Cardwell & Cooney, 2000). However, some agencies in various 
jurisdictions have discovered that the systems they developed did not match those created by 
allied agencies, even though the systems originated from the same ICS concept with the same 
goals of integration in mind (USDOT-RITA, 2007). 
Cardwell and Cooney (2000) identified the challenges of ICS best:   
With the need for the ability to integrate multidisciplinary resources from local, state, and 
federal agencies increasing, emergency response planners must consider using a standard 
system and encouraging as little deviation from that standard as possible. While local 
agencies must have the ability to modify the system to meet their individual needs, they 
also must understand the importance of minimizing these changes to ensure compatibility 
with other organizations. Agencies must work together to ensure that their ability to 
successfully integrate their emergency response systems remains as certain as their 
commitment to the safety of the American public and their personnel who must face the 
dangers of a sudden threat (p. 5). 
 
In the wake of 9/11, the need to better integrate critical-incident response mechanisms 
has become even greater.  We have seen that with the collapsing of all intelligence organizations 
under one terrorism czar (Office of Director of National Intelligence, 2008). 
The ICS systems are also finding their way to law enforcement collaborations, without the 
necessary involvement of the fire departments.  In the years that followed 9/11, ICS remained 
primarily the forte of fire services. Recently, however, law enforcement officials across the 
country have come to appreciate the value of a coordinated response to emergencies (IS-100.LE, 
2008). 
There are innumerable benefits to the law enforcement wing of critical-incident 
management’s adoption of ICS as the collaborative vehicle of choice. Vehicle collisions, 
pursuits, officer-involved shootings, terrorism, natural disasters, and civil disturbances represent 
only a few of the incidents for which an agency or department can use ICS. Whether they require 
the response of one agency or many, critical-incidents become more manageable with ICS 
(Conner, 1997). 
Under those circumstances involving multiple jurisdictions, ICS allows agencies to 
provide a singular response, as this review of literature has examined. As a planning tool, and in 
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the context of cross-training, ICS designates in advance the specific responsibilities of all agency 
personnel. More critically, ICS sets forth who will be in charge at the scene (Conner, 1997). 
In a Heritage Foundation report (2005) military researchers criticize the ICS agencies for 
refusing to delegate a leader, when in reality; the ICS accomplishes just that (Kochems, 2005). 
The public expects and deserves cooperation between agencies on the scene of an 
emergency, without jurisdictional disputes. Formalized agreements--whether between in-house 
participants or among other agencies--set the stage for integrated communication, centralized 
staging of resources, and the comprehensive management of those resources once deployed 
(Conner, 1997). 
ICS also eliminates 10 codes, which usually vary from agency to agency and can snarl 
interagency communication, as mentioned earlier in this literature review. Instead, agencies use 
common terms that laypersons can understand to promote understanding and improve response 
times for all involved agencies (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Finally, ICS provides a manageable 
bridge of control for the incident commander on the scene, who can provide overall scene 
management rather than become slowed by tasks better delegated to subordinates (NIMS-
Incident Command System, 2005). 
According to Conner (1997) ICS has simplified the management of critical-incidents by 
organizing the response into various modules or subgroups. Anyone in the agency, from the 
chief to the patrol officer, can implement ICS into its full configuration. The individual who 
initiates the ICS response usually assumes command on the scene, at the emergency command 
center, or at the field command post and becomes the incident commander. Unless formally 
relieved, the incident commander remains in charge and provides a single point of contact for the 
duration of the operational period; 
The incident commander oversees the entire operation through sectors, or branches, 
which provide a manageable span of control. Sectors can be collapsed, expanded, or 
added as needed during a specific incident. Others may not be needed at all for an 
emergency limited in scope or duration (Conner, 1997, p.1). 
 
For instance, ICS departments often are designated as being logistics, operations, 
individual personnel, and intelligence. ICS deployment during a large-scale vehicle crash, for 
instance, would not necessitate the help of the intelligence sector. The intelligence sector, for 
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obvious reasons, would only be invoked during terrorism or other related critical-incidents 
(Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005). 
However, other sectors such as traffic control, hazardous materials cleanup, or media 
liaison will surely play roles in a major traffic accident. Personnel officers would help on-site or 
follow up later at the hospital. Operations staff would collaborate on equipment needs, such as 
ambulances, tow trucks, police cars, and fire department resources (Conner, 1997). 
Sector leaders’ main capacities are to keep the incident commander apprised of their 
sectors' actions and – more importantly -- requirements, allowing the incident commander more 
leeway to match resources to existing conditions or predict future necessities. Various checklists 
make sure that sector leaders finish critical tasks during the incident. In light of the immense 
demands relegated to personnel at the scene of the incident, sector leaders could - without a 
second glance - overlook a possible resource or legal or departmental requirement (Conner, 
1997). That is why such tight coordination between section leaders and the incident commander 
is absolutely essential in navigating a crisis scene to a stasis. 
Of course, the myriad sectors or component parts within sectors usually vary from 
department to department, agency to agency, and jurisdiction to jurisdiction. More critical than 
the number and genre and variety of sectors is the capability of the agency to respond to various 
critical-incidents under a dedicated number of plans that may include allied agencies (Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, 2005). The law enforcement wings’ adoption of the ICS, then, is highly 
desirable and has already resulted in much positive change.  Now, with the collaboration of law 
enforcement and fire and rescue, with the assistance of the military – as described later in this 
literature review – the public is truly better served today by ICS than it was years ago and years 
before that by no system of integration at all. That said, ICS has a long way to go to gain the 
efficiency and the results that its supporters desire (Cotter, 2007). 
 
The Federal Response 
 
There exist two quotes from government officials following the 1979 nuclear power plant 
disaster at Three Mile Island that best set the tone for agency collaboration in the event of a 
terrorist attack:  First, "I've learned that emergencies can only be managed by people at the site, 
they can't be managed back in Washington" (Carlson, 1999, ¶ 1). And second; 
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 Expect the unexpected and be prepared to adjust accordingly. The importance of limiting 
those things that any executive should attempt to do in the time allowed, and the 
importance of carefully choosing one's battles, is implicit in the fact that some of the 
toughest of those battles will be chosen for you (Carlson, 1999, ¶ 2). 
 
These two quotes could also apply to other incidents including terrorist attacks, the 
potential of which have darkened the United States’ existence for the past several years. The 
International Association of Chiefs of Police labels an actual disaster as an incident that threatens 
to or actually takes lives, causes substantial risk to property or the well-being of the community 
or a segment of that community, or requires a commitment of resources beyond those normally 
available (Carlson, 1999). 
 
Carlson (1999) also noted;  
 
Such incidents may become more frequent and deadly as criminals and terrorist groups 
exploit the availability of chemical substances, biological agents, and nuclear materials to 
construct weapons of mass destruction. Reasons for accessibility include the increased 
volume and types of substances produced, the failure of security systems to protect the 
materials, the transfer of prohibited weapons to irresponsible governments or the 
proliferation of various materials to countries that previously did not perceive a need for 
sophisticated weaponry (¶ 4). 
 
As outlined in this literature review, essentially two ways exist to manage a crisis. One 
way means ignoring the necessity to set forth a particular command structure before a crisis 
occurs and then being forced to invent such a structure during the actual incident’s tenure. This 
route means that onsite command or management personalities must create a working incident 
structure while simultaneously trying to manage the developing crisis (Carlson, 1999). 
The second option means defining the incident command, coordination, communication, and 
operational direction. The unified command and control of the emergency, the creation of 
strategic and tactical goals, and the integration of resources and individuals from all responding 
agencies determine the efficacy and efficiency of the total government response to the crisis 
(Carlson, 1999). 
 Accordingly, the most important question for incident management professionals and 
administrative staff is how they can direct resources from many agencies of different disciplines 
at all levels of government in a helpful, efficient, and coordinated way to address a potential 
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technical disaster and maintain the faith, respect, in some cases obedience, and in all situations 
pure confidence of the citizens who may become the victims (Carlson, 1999). 
Simultaneously, these professionals have to deal with additional crisis management 
difficulties including changing management objectives, differing value systems, political 
harassment, too little data, too much data, poor data-handling methods, little planning, 
insufficient time to learn, and confusion (Carlson, 1999).  
 
According to Carlson;  
 
The ICS requires planning and practice on the part of the participating agencies. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible for the various emergency response agencies at all levels 
of government to develop and practice plans with one another to address the uncountable 
scenarios in the thousands of different venues across the United States. However, an 
application of ICS to accommodate different levels of response represents an alternative 
to this maze of potential pairings of responding agencies. Through a well-developed ICS, 
state and local governments can alert their state, local and county response agencies and 
deploy them under the predefined ICS, thus ensuring that a unified command and 
response team immediately begins to address the crisis and its consequences (p. 2). 
 
Creating a Joint Operations Center (JOC) is another tactic. In response to a domestic 
misuse of weapons of mass destruction incident, a presidential directive designates the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the lead agency of all federal resources, as mentioned earlier in 
this review of literature. To facilitate this responsibility, the FBI employs a joint operations 
center (FBI JOC Management, 2008), which in turn employs many of the concepts critical to the 
state-level ICS. This center coordinates interagency operational and support requirements of any 
joint deployment and manages joint agency public information and media interaction and 
generally oversees all matters pertaining to the incident (Carlson, 1999).  
The federal agencies that work in such incidents have worked with the FBI in exercises 
and drills based on the Joint Operations Command (JOC) concept. Commanders and managers 
from the various responding federal and state agencies converge as a joint operations command 
coalition to address critical decisions regarding incident management and amelioration (Carlson, 
1999). 
As for the actual high-level leadership, the FBI designates a Special Agent-in-Charge 
(SAC) to convene and head the on-site command group (FBI JOC Management, 2008). 
According to Carlson and FBI briefings, the SAC may recommend technical and scientific 
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moves with potential catastrophic consequences to higher federal authority as required by 
training and specific manuals and guidelines (FBI JOC Management, 2008). 
The SAC also keeps a direct line of communication open with the FBI director and with 
the attorney general as well. As a result, the important interfacing and collaboration of state and 
local operations with federal operations, and vice versa, occur through the various manifestations 
of the JOC. An efficient working relationship between all levels of government in this type of 
incident management is not an option; it is absolutely essential (FBI JOC Management, 2008). 
The key question remains, especially in light of the magnitude and effect of any potential 
terrorist assault:  How does the JOC interface with the state and local ICS? First, unification of 
command and combination of operations is essential. As Carlson (1999) stated; 
Specialized federal technical and scientific resources can rely on the FBI, including its 
personnel with whom they have practiced, for a single format of decision making that 
remains the same no matter which community hosts the incident. The local FBI office 
where the incident occurs holds the key to managing deployed federal personnel and 
resources and organizing the JOC. Already familiar with state and local resources, these 
FBI offices must become acquainted with the ICS response plans for those states or 
communities within their regions. This melding of command and control resources builds 
a bridge between the federal JOC and the state ICS (p. 3). 
 
Also, the task of starting familiarization meetings and training camps at all government 
levels for terrorist incident management lies equally on state and federal officials in the various 
regions. The delegated incident commanders of the state or local ICS and the SAC of the JOC 
must work together through exercises and drills prior to a real test of their capabilities. The 
success of combining federal technical and scientific assets, which are completely foreign to 
local and state responders for so many reasons, with state and local personnel and assets will 
transpire only through the competent management skills of the state ICS incident commanders 
together with the SAC (Carlson, 1999). 
For instance, the management of the Oklahoma City bombing demonstrates how the 
meaningful use of multiagency assets succeeded because of planning, preparation, and joint 
alliances. The former Oklahoma City chief of police acknowledged the importance of 
establishing great working relationships with federal authorities and the local fire chief before a 
crisis because of the near impossibility of doing so once a crisis – particularly a terrorist attack – 
starts (Carlson, 1999). 
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The federal and local response can actually transform into a combined incident command 
at the time of a terrorist crisis only with cooperation and preplanning on a local level between 
state ICS and FBI commanders (FBI JOC Management, 2008, ¶ 7).  In fact, predetermination of 
roles and duties, crisis training and exercising of personnel, and a desire to prepare for the 
unfathomable will permit this melding of FBI and incident-crisis-management resources.  A 
federal report emphasizes this point in two statements: "Unified command...is essential...to avoid 
chaos and coordinate tactical activities" and "[t]he issue of who is the primary agency in charge 
is not to be determined on the emergency scene" (Recommendations for Organizations and 
Operations During Civil Disturbance, 1994, p. 56). 
Basically, preparation for managing a weapon of mass destruction disaster primarily 
requires an understanding of the magnitude of the potential ramifications.  When all involved 
responding agencies, departments, and jurisdictions have that huge potential outcome in full 
focus, they will comprehend the truly essential elements of planning, training, cooperation, 
liaison, resource definition, and coherent public policy implementation (Carlson, 1999). 
As a result, incident managers cannot wait for such an incident to occur to invent a process for 
tackling the next one. As Carlson (1999, p.3) noted, “They must manage the first event 
intelligently and with a meaningful application of resources and leadership at all levels of 
government”.  
In 2000 the Federal government mandated a single, no-advance, no-notice exercise that 
was planned and implemented by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) in May of 2000 (USDHS, 2009). The goal of TOPOFF was to 
test the ability of federal, state, and local governments to respond to and mitigate a major 
terrorist attack. This test involved more than 6,500 individuals from all levels of government 
responding to a simulated biological attack in Denver, Colorado and a simulated chemical attack 
in Portsmouth, New Hampshire (USDHS, 2009). In 2003, a second exercise, TOPOFF2, was 
completed with advance notice to 8,500 federal, state, and local participants (USDHS, 2009). 
This was the first national exercise following the September 11, 2001, attack and was 
coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security (USDHS, 2009). TOPOFF 2 targeted two 
major cities Chicago, which was tasked with a biological attack, and Seattle, which was assigned 
a simulated radiological dispersal device (RDD) (USDHS, 2009). TOPOFF 3 was conducted in 
April, 2005. This exercise was significant in that this was the first national test using the all 
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encompassing National Response Plan (NRP) (USDHS, 2009). TOPOFF 3 also included 
representatives from the private sector as well allied foreign governments. TOPOFF 3 focused 
on a simulated chemical attack in New London, Connecticut and a simulated biological attack in 
New Jersey (USDHS, 2009). TOPOFF 3 involved over 10,000 participants and focused on 
terrorism prevention, risk communication, and public information venues as well as long-term 
recovery and remediation issues (USDHS, 2009).  The final national exercise that focused on 
response and recovery was TOPOFF 4. This exercise was conducted in Portland, Oregon; 
Phoenix, Arizona; the U.S. territory of Guam, as well as Washington, D.C. TOPOFF 4 included 
an increased emphasis on prevention, long-term recovery and remediation issues, 
communications and coordination with international allies (USDHS, 2009). More than 15,000 
participants were included in TOPOFF 4 and involved the governments of Australia, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom. All targets were subjected to a simulated radiological attack (USDHS, 
2009). 
  
ICS:  A Military Critique 
 
 Throughout American history, the military has drawn many of its best practices and ideas 
from law enforcement, and vice versa.  As a result, an examination of the military’s collaborative 
practices will shed light on this study’s analysis on collaboration and cross-training from a 
critical-incident management perspective (Banner, 2004). 
Perhaps even more critically, local and state law enforcement officials are often in 
positions wherein they need to collaborate directly with the military in order to reach their goals.  
Banner (2004) put it best:   
 
Recent events in U.S. history and ongoing planning have indicated that increasingly our 
military must be prepared to work with various domestic civilian agencies. But how is 
this done and how do we integrate operations when this happens? It is not as simple as 
many people may believe. Any assumption that we can easily get along because we are 
"all Americans" is wrong. Organizationally and functionally, the U.S. Department of 
Defense has much more in common with allied and most often even enemy military 
organizations than with local civilian governments in the United States. Integrating 
operations is therefore something that needs planning and study if it is going to work 
(p.1).  
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Banner (2004) reported that the military had made progress in the last few years in 
improving joint and combined operations-working with all U.S. public services and working 
with the military forces from other nations. There are, unfortunately, no equivalent systems 
within U.S. civilian agencies. 
Because the military will normally be authorized to function in a support role during a 
domestic incident, providing assistance that only the military can bring, it is the Department of 
Defense’s responsibility to go the extra mile in learning about the civilian systems it might 
encounter. To do this, the armed forces need to become familiar with the systems and 
idiosyncrasies of the civilian world and conform to their modes of operation and also their 
various method of integrating among their own agencies (Banner, 2004). 
Banner (2004) stated:  
As a starting point, it is critical for the military to understand the civilian approach to 
organizational management and how ICS fits into the civilian world. To be blunt, there is 
no common doctrine or hardly anything that would be recognized as such for day-to-day 
operations (¶ 3).  
 
From the military’s perspective, leadership and management are unique to each 
institution and official (Banner, 2004). Every civilian organization such as police, fire or rescue, 
from the local up through the federal level, is organized and led differently. Going back to the 
colonial period, each developed independently and followed an independent course (Banner, 
2004).  Even the military analysts admit that in many ways that is part of the strength of the 
United States, and the federal system and local home rule are valuable products of a democratic 
society. 
For all the benefits of local control, the disadvantage for emergency operations is most 
definitely that there is no commonality in the military’s view (Banner, 2004, p.1). Local 
governments make modifications at their own paces and there exists no standardized operational 
structure across local boundaries let along state lines (Banner, 2004, p.1). That is part of the 
reason that ICS has gained such dominance according to the military studies -- because there was 
the recognition that some form of doctrine and system was needed for emergency operations 
when assets from multiple jurisdictions needed to cooperate and work more efficiently. It was 
also an admission that the systems in existence for managing day-to-day operations were 
insufficient for critical-incident management. 
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Indeed, the military skepticism regarding ICS does not end there, Banner (2004) stated;    
 
Having said that civilian government has embraced ICS and that most public officials 
have at least heard the acronym, very few of them understand it or how it works; their 
focus is on day-to-day operations and the challenges of their routine activities (those 
challenges for which they were elected and will be reelected). A strength of the military 
structure is leaders are trained and promoted through the system they will use for live 
operations, thereby getting an understanding of subordinate roles and functions. The 
civilian world is hit-or-miss; elected leaders frankly have no requirement to know 
anything about the nuts and bolts of specific governmental functions, emergency 
management included (p.1).  
 
In most circumstances, ICS is a system just for emergencies in the military’s viewpoint 
(Banner, 2004). However, the system is much more than that:  Any collaborative system, 
especially something as flexible as ICS, provides opportunities for cross-training and the 
improvement of each individual agency within the collaboration, event, or incident. But, the fact 
remains that the military sees no function for the ICS outside of emergent situations.  As such, in 
their view, hardly anyone uses ICS routinely. The military’s analysis exempts the fire 
departments from this appraisal, as Banner (2004) stated:   
The fire services are probably the one outstanding exception, because they do emergency 
operations all the time; thus another challenge, a weakness in the system and an issue for 
military integration, is that ICS is generally not a standing system. Civilian agencies will 
be making the transition to this system while they are in the middle of an emergency. 
That is a clear drawback and something that plagues most emergency operations (p. 1).  
 
Banner (2004) remarked that the implementation of ICS certainly had not solved many of 
the problems of civilian government according to the military analysts. The best it had done was 
to offer the hope of a better method to organize and operate (p. 2) . Some locations with 
particularly inspired leadership or a strong emergency management system may function 
tolerably according to the military, but many organizations will end up floundering during an 
emergency because they are trying to learn a new system and reorganize in the middle of the 
emergency at the same time (Banner, 2004). That said, the Department of Defense acknowledges 
that however inferior it views the ICS to be, it must link up with it during emergencies so it must 
learn to deal with what terms idiosyncrasies and imperfections (Banner, 2004).  
For the applications of this review of literature and the goals of this paper, the military 
criticism of ICS is valuable from the standpoint that it generates practical ways in which the ICS 
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can improve or at least be adapted to a planned foreseeable emergency that will be discussed in 
further length in the Data Analysis section and then in the Summary, Conclusions, and 
Recommendations section as well. In brief, the ICS can stand to learn from the military’s 
insistence on anticipating every contingency before an emergency.  The military’s training also 
is closer to the reality of an emergency than law enforcement’s or critical-incident management’s 
in general.  However, as civilian organizations the ICS agencies cannot expect to be run as a 
command unit – nor should they.  Their leadership and goals are different, but without changing 
those fundamentals, it is possible to learn from the military’s experience and critique of ICS and 
the civilian critical-incident management and law enforcement agencies’ work during 
emergencies such as the existing Federal Response Plan (FRP). 
The Federal Response Plan outlines the individual state’s responsibility in the event of an 
emergency. Under the federal plan the state has complete autonomy under most identified 
incidents. The state even has the authority to direct federal assets to a certain extent. Under the 
Stafford Act the state should design and implement an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). All 
EOPs should have the following elements (FEMA-SLG, 1996, p. 4-1): 
 
1. Introductory Material, certain items that enhance accountability and ease of use. 
2. Purpose of the Plan, a general statement of what the EOP is meant to do. 
3. Situation and Assumptions, this narrows the scope of the EOP by identifying what 
hazards the EOP addresses, what jurisdictional issues which may affect the response, 
and finally what assumptions are being presumed rather than facts. 
4. Concept of Operations, this section explains the entities overall approach to an 
incident, what should happen, when, and who is in charge.  
5. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities, this section establishes the 
emergency organization that will be relied on to respond to an emergency situation. 
6. Administration and Logistics, this section covers general support requirements and 
the availability of services and support for all types of emergencies. 
7. Plan Development and Maintenance, the overall approach to planning, including the 
assignment of planning responsibilities.  
8. Authorities and References, this section refers to the legal basis for operations and 
activities. 
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  The Emergency Operations Plan should address many operational functions. Such 
functions as direction and control, warning, emergency public information, and evacuation 
actions must be factored in the earliest stages of an incident (FEMA-SLG, 1996). All of these 
operational functions are outside the federal response mission and should not be considered for 
implementation into a Federal Response Plan. It is for the state to choose functions and actions 
that will be the “best fit” or “best practices” into daily operations, policies, governmental 
structure, and resources. Every state EOP should identify and be prepared to mitigate any type of 
disaster. This approach is termed “all hazards” planning. The state is directly responsible for the 
safety and security of all its citizens and the protection of key infrastructure and support 
facilities. A state may choose to delegate some responsibilities to local jurisdictions to ensure 
continuation of operations within the local counties, cities and towns (FEMA-SLG, 1996).  
Specific elements of a state EOP plan would be to identify departments and agencies that 
have been tasked to perform response and recovery and lists those activities the entities will or 
should accomplish (FEMA-SLG, 1996).  The EOP should outline the assistance that could be 
provided to local jurisdictions during disasters that local agency emergency response and 
recovery asset capabilities could not accomplish (FEMA-SLG, 1996). The Emergency 
Operations Plan will specify the communications procedures and systems the state will use to 
alert, notify, recall, and dispatch responders and communicate with other states or elements 
within the federal government (FEMA-SLG, 1996). Additionally, the plan sets forth 
requirements that will be taken to make initial situation assessment from the local jurisdiction(s) 
that have been directly impacted by the disaster. Typically, this information provides an early 
assessment of the damage or extent of the incident (FEMA-SLG, 1996, p.7-6): 
1. The approximate number of disaster victims that have been: 
−  Injured, killed, or are missing. 
−  Evacuated from the area impacted by the disaster. 
−  Housed in mass care facilities. 
2. The damage done to lifeline systems such as hospitals, power plants, water and 
sanitation systems, etc. 
3. The damage done to transportation networks such as airports, major roads and 
bridges, rail lines, ports, etc.  
4. The types of assistance (food, water, medical, etc.) the jurisdiction will require to 
satisfy the immediate needs of disaster victims. 
 
The plan also has instructions for the legal formation of Regional/State Memorandums of 
Understanding (MOU). The MOU describes the assistance criteria and scope or amount of assets 
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that have been dedicated to ensure joint federal-state operations during large-scale disasters. The 
following list identifies some of the typical responsibilities contained in the MOUs that may be 
addressed in the state EOP (FEMA-SLG, 1996, p.7-6): 
1.  Provisions for notifying the FEMA Regional Office about the occurrence of a disaster 
or evolving emergency situation that may warrant activation of the Regional 
Response Plan (RRP). 
2. Communication protocols to include means of communication, frequency of contact, 
and message content (e.g. warning messages, situation reports, requests for 
assistance, etc.). 
3. Provisions for requesting Federal Response Teams (FRT) to assist the State. 
a. Requesting that a Firefighter Assist and Search Team (FAST) be deployed to 
assist the State in assessing the disaster situation. 
b.  Designating individuals to participate as State Emergency Management Agency 
representatives on the FAST teams. 
c. Preparing a joint (FEMA/State) Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA). 
d. Provisions for providing work space and communication support to the Regional 
liaison officers and other Federal teams deployed to the State EOC, staging areas, 
or the area directly impacted by the disaster. 
e. Provisions for designating a State Coordinating Officer (SCO) to work directly 
with the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). 
f. Provisions for assisting the FCO in identifying candidate locations for 
establishing the Disaster Field Office (DFO). 
The EOP outlines how interstate Memorandums of Understanding (agreements between 
neighboring states) should be activated and maintained throughout the incident (FEMA-SLG, 
1996, p.7-7). 
 In 2002 President George W. Bush signed into law the Homeland Security Act requiring 
all local and state governments in the United States to become compliant with the Federal 
Response Plan. This broad mandate was specifically established for the 88,000 state and local 
governments (GASB, 2009) throughout the county.  The theory of applying “Best Practices” in 
relying on how each branch of government integrates actions and policy is left up to local and 
state politicians and planners. The responsibilities of state politicians in incident management 
should be clear. Governors’ of each state have the final responsibility for the “safety and well-
being” of the state’s population (USHHS, 2009). Each governor may temporarily suspend state 
laws or regulations that will interfere with the programmed or logical response (USHHS, 2009).  
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The Arizona Example 
 
One logical method to study ICS in action is to examine exactly how one state 
implements the system. The Arizona Department of Public Safety (ADPS) uses ICS daily under 
many different circumstances. Three particular levels of response announce what resources and 
how many of each resource to commit to each incident; Level I incidents require that one or two 
officers resolve minor traffic accidents, make arrests, or perhaps conduct light crowd control 
(Conner, 1997). Level II incidents in Arizona’s interpretation and implementation of ICS require 
the assistance of three or more officers and obviously signify events of greater magnitude 
(Conner, 1997). Incidents usually involve several types of agencies and may cross jurisdictional 
boundaries. Examples include collisions that results in road closures or evacuations. Level III 
incidents involve three or more officers from multiple shifts, require support from other bureaus, 
districts, or agencies, and mandate a significant response to contain, control, and recover from 
the critical-incident (Conner,1997). Without a doubt, Level III incidents receive the most 
training focus today as terrorism is on the forefront of everyone’s worries and attention and 
funding dollars are available through Department of Homeland Security grants and other 
vehicles (Conner,1997). 
Situations classified as Level II or III require the use of an incident report log by the 
sector leaders and incident manager (Conner, 1997).  By keeping accurate records the Arizona 
Department of Public Safety can monitor their own responses and the responses of allied 
agencies to improve upon their performance for critical-incidents yet to occur. The log also 
provides documentation that might be needed later in court in the event of litigation, which in the 
case of traffic accidents is highly likely (Conner, 1997). The Arizona Department of Public 
Safety has developed an ICS manual to deal with the multiple types of emergency issues that 
occur every year (Conner, 1997). Arizona created this manual to be user-friendly to officers on 
an active scene. The manual includes information officers find useful in managing critical-
incidents as they occur. 
Conner (1997) stressed that the ICS manual should deal with statutes that articulate legal 
precedents and remove impediments to the agency's response (¶ 22). As an example, agencies 
can call the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and request that all unnecessary aircraft be 
turned away from the scene of a critical-incident.  For this reason, the ICS manual contains a 
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copy of the applicable statute as well as the protocol for enlisting the FAA's assistance (Conner, 
1997). 
Conner (1997) provided an example of a critical-incident where the manual came in very 
handy:   
 
An actual event emphasizes the need to address such contingencies. During a recent 
incident in Los Angeles, media helicopters interfered with the apprehension of armed 
bank robbers and drew their fire, worsening an already-hazardous situation. By 
incorporating lessons learned from past incidents, agencies can develop comprehensive 
manuals to guide them through future emergencies (¶ 22). 
 
In addition to the ICS manual, Conner (1997) suggested using a separate guide known as 
a “standing plan” that sets forth the appropriate response to events or civil emergencies that the 
agency sees less frequently or can prepare for in advance (¶ 22). Examples of uses for the 
“standing plan” include crowd control at large concerts, sporting events, and civil 
demonstrations.  It is controversial as to whether terrorist attacks should have grounding the 
“standing plan” (¶ 22).  Proponents feel that there should be standing procedures in place; critics 
are afraid that the procedures will act as impediments to constitutional protections in place to 
prevent any semblance of a police state (Conner, 1997). 
As for direct training, the Arizona Department of Public Safety’s comprehensive training 
program begins at its training academy with a 4-hour straight set of instruction. Desk exercises 
test collaboration candidates' knowledge of ICS procedures via the manual and illustrate how 
they might perform during an emergency (Conner, 1997). 
A more reliable indicator of performance comes later; however, both announced and 
surprise disaster drills test the readiness and response capabilities of DPS employees and 
those from other agencies. Ironically, just 3 weeks before the bus crash, Phoenix public 
safety employees--including police, fire, and emergency medical services personnel--
staged a simulated bus collision to test their preparedness. This training greatly enhanced 
the agencies' response capabilities when the real crash occurred (¶ 24). 
 
Civilian employees who because of their position within an agency become integrated 
with emergency response should not be bypassed for training under the Arizona procedures. 
Dispatchers, crime scene technicians, and logistical support employees are important 
components of the total ICS response. They also should participate in drills to ensure their ability 
to handle emergencies (Conner, 1997). 
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Administrators who need additional assistance with training or any other aspect of ICS 
should rely on other agencies for guidance such as most state police and large municipal 
departments that use some form of ICS (Conner, 1997). Other potential sources for information 
and expert training include local fire departments, the National Fire Academy, state emergency 
management agencies, and, perhaps most critically for terrorist incidents, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (Conner, 1997). 
The Arizona example provided evidence that the Incident Command System is a simple 
yet effective way of training for and helping to mitigate critical-incidents. The ICS promotes a 
collaborative answer to critical-incidents with appropriate resources by structuring a central 
command of communication, actual incident command, and of course, on-site control (Conner, 
1997).  Periodic disaster training prepares emergency responders in advance, and this at least 
partly answers the military criticism. Careful mandated recordkeeping forces investigations to 
stay on track and provides an efficacious manner to actually evaluate agencies' real response. 
Incident Command Systems allow agencies to handle emergencies quickly and confidently 
(Conner, 1997). 
Of course, this is not to say that there is no way for ICS systems to improve.  As 
mentioned above, Arizona is one of the states with the best and longest record of dealing with 
ICS collaboration, and its level of proficiency both in training and in practices is more the 
exception rather than the rule (Arizona Emergency Management Commission, 2008). That said, 
ICS still provides an excellent framework that can be expanded – and history has shown that 
incident managers and state legislators will expand it when needed – to better suit an incident or 
the changing times. 
Coordination in Highway Emergencies 
 
 Examination of law enforcement’s and critical-incident management’s collaborative 
efforts in highway emergencies is valuable because that is the area in which national, state, and 
local agencies have the most experience today; and that experience can be extrapolated, when 
successful, to dealing with larger scale issues such as weapons of mass destruction and terrorism 
(USDOT-RITA, 2007).  Highway incidents, of course, fluctuate in type and scale -- from life-
threatening disasters such as a multi-car-and-truck pileup or even a hazardous material (hazmat) 
spill on an interstate highway to a much more minor no-injury, one-car crash into a yield sign on 
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a small street (USDOT-RITA, 2007). Because more than 50 % of the situations involving traffic 
jams are generated by incident-related delays, highway agencies own a major stake in the 
efficient management of roadway incident scenes to restore normal traffic flow as quickly as 
safety allows (Allred, 2004). 
However, according to Allred (2004):  
 
Highway agencies typically have no direct control over how quickly a roadway is cleared 
after an incident because emergency scenes are controlled by the first-response agencies 
that have statutory jurisdiction (fire, emergency medical services, and law enforcement). 
Highway agencies usually are considered "second responders," with a mission to clear 
the roadway and restore traffic flow after the first responders have addressed the primary 
mission of protecting public safety and health. In practice, first and second responders 
usually cooperate to recover normal traffic flow as quickly as possible. But what happens 
when a crash blocks the roadway longer than necessary, and highway agencies have no 
influence on decisions about how to manage the incident (¶ 2). 
 
The Model Procedures Guide for Highway Incidents, a draft document developed by the 
National Fire Service Incident Management System Consortium, demonstrates how an ICS used 
for many years by the fire departments and emergency management agencies can be extrapolated 
to various types of highway incidents. Funded by the U.S. Department of Transportation's 
(USDOT) Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) Public Safety Program, the Model 
Procedures Guide (MPG) adapts the consortium's ICS to highway incident operations (Allred, 
2004). The guide provides concrete and real-life examples of command structures for a wide 
variety of highway incident scenarios -- from terrorist events to winter storms, parades, hazmat 
spills, and typical motor vehicle crashes.  The idea is to perform the thinking and the testing 
beforehand, so when an incident occurs all that remains is the actual execution with very little 
on-the-ground analysis. 
The MPG guide takes into account that traffic flow continuance is an important and 
worthwhile end.  Allred (2004) stated the Model Procedures Guide for Highway Incidents 
addresses the need to balance the safety of motorists, responders, and victims with the need to 
restore traffic flow and the Model Procedures Committee asks incident commanders to consider 
the following motivating points when managing a highway incident:  
* Provide emergency services and remove the traffic blockage as quickly as possible 
* Protect responders (and those in their care) from being struck by moving vehicles 
* Protect motorists, passengers, and cargo from the hazards of the incident 
* Facilitate the movement of emergency response vehicles 
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* Facilitate traffic flow past the incident and throughout the region, as necessary and           
when possible (¶ 6). 
 
As Allred (2004) demonstrated, highway agencies are able to garner an excess of benefits 
from striving with other allied response agencies to adopt common yardsticks for managing 
highway incidents. Needless to say, written guidelines are critical. They provide a standardized, 
predictable tack and may be applied routinely until perfection is achieved or a better method is 
discovered. Written guidelines also provide a training tool for responders, offer a baseline for 
critiques and reviews of incidents, and make the commander's operations more effective. In sum, 
written guidelines either can reflect strict policies or allow flexibility in managing incidents 
(Allred, 2004). 
But scenario-based guidelines are also incredibly useful.  The Model Procedures Guide 
for Highway Incidents contains a series of scenarios, with a specific instance for each scenario of 
a complete, systematic organizational structure based on the ICS. The structure is created to give 
the major functions of command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration 
experience in functioning and practice (Allred, 2004). Local agencies decide themselves how to 
individually provide staffing for these standardized tasks based on the outlined scenarios. 
The committee designed this ICS for use during all genres and magnitudes of highway 
incidents, from routine mechanical breakdowns and crashes to severe weather and terrorist 
events. The ICS allows the organizational structure to expand and contract – as mentioned earlier 
in this literature review – as dictated by the severity and circumstances of the incident, 
permitting a smooth transition between single-unit responses and large multi-agency operations, 
the equivalent of Level III in the Arizona system (Allred, 2004). 
Allred (2004) found that: 
 
The IMS builds the organization from the ground up, adding functional units for new 
activities. The incident is partitioned into manageable tasks, and the best-qualified 
response resources are assigned to each need. As the incident grows in complexity, the 
system maintains a safe span of control and ensures that all activity is conducted under a 
single chain of command. The IMS ensures the safety of responders, crash victims, and 
motorists, while responders mitigate the impact of the incident on traffic flow and the 
surrounding community (¶ 10). 
 
Allred (2004) also stated the ICS model could move beyond traditional first responders to 
target support functions as well: 
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The concepts in the guide were proven effective by emergency service crews, who also 
fine-tuned the IMS in the field over nearly 30 years, and the American National 
Standards Institute codified IMS as National Fire Protection Association Standard 1561. 
Nonemergency responders--such as transportation, public works, and public health 
agencies--also can be incorporated into the IMS organization. The terminology used in 
the guide was chosen carefully to convey a uniform message to users from all response 
professions and for all levels of Government (¶ 11).  
 
In addition, the ICS acknowledges that all highway incidents are controlled under and 
come under the auspices of the authority of the agencies that have actual, real statutory 
jurisdiction. Multi-jurisdictional incidents, on the other hand, may be managed under a unified 
command structure that includes representation from each jurisdiction. Supporting agencies also 
assist through contributing valuable or unique resources; onsite representatives who are familiar 
with the incident can provide expert information and assistance (Allred, 2004). The highway 
safety procedures detailed here provide a valuable informational template for local, state and 
federal agencies’ responses in the event of a weapon of mass destruction incident or other 
terrorist attack (Allred, 2004). 
The procedures would be exactly the same:  A guideline is not only helpful, it is 
imperative.  However, in constructing a guideline for ICS-style cross-agency collaboration in the 
event of terrorist attacks, researchers stress the need for flexibility such that first responders can 
actually respond in the manner for which the situation calls and not be beholden to a set of 
immutable rules in the guidelines. But as long as flexibility and malleability are built into the 
guidelines, the same processes for traffic accidents can be extrapolated to define the roles of 
various collaborating agencies in the event of another terrorist attack (USDOT-RITA, 2007). 
 
I-35 Bridge Collapse 
 
The Emergency Management and Response-Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
(EMR-ISAC) stated that NIMS outlines were significantly realized when the I-35W Bridge 
collapsed on August 1, 2007, in Minneapolis, Minnesota. After action summaries validate that 
the Unified Command System component of the NIMS model allowed for a response that 
Minneapolis Fire Chief Jim Clack described as: 
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Having everyone on the same sheet of music. Quite simply, it (NIMS) worked because of 
interagency training and support. Training exercises were conducted with regional 
responders who participated in numerous exercises together so that, as Chief Clack said, 
We all know each other and our capabilities. And, they were all there where they needed 
to be. The exercises sure paid off (USFA, 2007, ¶ 12). 
  
According to Hennepin County (Minnesota) Sheriff Rich Stanek, "We have a unified 
command system now where everyone-police, fire, sheriff's office, doctors, coroners, local and 
state and federal officials-operate under one voice" (USFA, 2007, ¶ 13).  When the bridge fell, 
unified command was implemented immediately and followed with the activation of a state 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) that included key personnel from all emergency response 
organizations; state departments of agriculture, education, health, transportation, natural 
resources, and human services; the Salvation Army; American Red Cross; and the city's finance 
director (USFA, 2007) . The response involved at least 75 state, local, and federal agencies. 
Incoming crews reported to staging areas established on both sides of the bridge. All responding 
agencies operated under the 800 megahertz radio frequency system (VIPER) and communicated 
successfully (USFA, 2007). In his report before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland 
Security in September 2007 Secretary Michael Chertoff, Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), stated 75 interoperability scorecards were issued to urban and metropolitan local 
jurisdictions. The scorecards focused on three topics: governance, standard operating procedures, 
and equipment. Key findings include:  
• Policies for interoperable communications are now in place in all 75 urban and 
metropolitan areas (¶ 18).  
• Regular testing and exercises are needed to effectively link disparate systems to allow 
communications between multi-jurisdictional responders (including state and federal)    
(¶ 19).  
• Cooperation among first responders in the field is strong, but formalized governance 
(leadership and strategic planning) across regions needs further improvement (¶ 20).  
Secretary Chertoff stated one urban area that scored well within the survey was the 
Minneapolis/St. Paul urban area. Specifically, this areas training and capability were used during 
the I-35 bridge collapse (USFA, 2007). 
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Areas of Concern 
 
Cole (2000) reported that the historical model of Incident Command (FIRESCOPE) had 
originated within the fire service. Large and complex incidents with ever changing variables 
tasked managers to the limit in placing equipment and personnel in the most efficient location 
and time. The ICS system was born out of a specific need, to protect life and property from 
California’s wild land fires. The original model concerned itself with only the fire service; 
however, within this function elements of air operations, heavy equipment allocation and use, 
staging areas, meteorological expertise, and logistical considerations for maintaining a workforce 
in locations not designed or equipped to handle this footprint were involved. The numerous 
functions associated with only one primary goal, to extinguish a fire, allowed FIRESCOPE to 
evolve into the foundation of the Incident Command System. Incident managers realized to 
manage one incident numerous disciplines must be employed to mitigate a crisis (Cole, 2000). In 
1972 when the first seven regional fire service agencies met and developed FIRESCOPE training 
and communications were primary issues in consolidating agencies separated by budget, 
personnel, jurisdiction, and distance. Irwin (2000) reported the adoption of Incident Command 
practices that were enveloped into the National Interagency Incident Management System 
(NIIMS). Agencies throughout the United States were establishing protocols to manage critical-
incidents.  
Law enforcement agencies began to use ICS concepts in a vacuum, each agency prepared 
policies and guidelines to manage its own issues (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Major planned 
events, the 1984 Olympics held in Los Angeles, California and subsequent others allowed 
enlightened law enforcement managers to see the ICS model in operation and incorporate 
elements into their own policies. Traditionally, law enforcement operating within itself manages 
the majority of incidents without extended duration on site, often within one operational cycle (8 
to 12 hours) (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Law enforcement managers began to focus on using 
the support functions of medical, fire, utility, and other agencies to mitigate a law enforcement 
response. No common communication approach or previous interaction was in place prior to the 
development of ICS concepts (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Previously, agencies only dealt with 
unique logistical issues during the actual incident. This ad hoc approach lacked a structured 
response and formalized agreements between agencies not normally associated with each other 
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were needed (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Agencies need to integrate multidisciplinary 
resources and responses from local, state, and federal resources. This integration must be made 
with as little deviation as possible. Training and coordination must be addressed when 
establishing new protocols highlighting the requirement for this standardization (Cardwell & 
Clooney, 2000).  
In 1993 the United States Attorney General was presented with a memorandum that 
detailed possible command and control issues that could arise if individual federal, state, and 
local agencies used their own management styles within a common incident (Rohen, 2001). New 
federal protocols were established and training was conducted using the criteria established. 
After action debriefings of those exercises indicated multiple agencies could function within the 
new ICS concepts (Rohen, 2001). The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act was signed into existence in 1988 (USGAO, 1997). This established the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency as the lead agency for consequence management. In 1995 PDD 
39 was signed, establishing the FBI as the lead agency for terrorism prevention and investigation 
(USGAO, 1997). Both FEMA and the FBI along with a myriad of other federal, state and local 
mitigation, support, and law enforcement agencies must function within a previously established 
command structure at that time unknown to most with the exception of policy makers (Rohen, 
2001). Again, the need for standardized training was made apparent in exercises such as 
TOPOFF 1-4 (USDHS, 2009). Specifically, communications and coordination between agencies 
using ICS criteria were cited as the most common barriers identified by participants.    
State and local response examples from this literature review reinforced this concern and 
placed emphasis on training and communication within all first responder entities. The Arizona 
model of response established a level I, II, and III response protocol throughout the state. All 
employees of Arizona’s Department of Public Safety were trained and knowledgeable of the 
protocols used (Conner, 1997). Arizona was at the forefront of ICS integration with mandated 
use of policies and the publication of a state-wide user friendly manual that eliminated confusion 
from participants (Conner, 1997). Allred (2004) indicated the Model Procedures Guide (MPG) 
published by the United States Department of Transportation provides real-life examples of 
command structures for highway incidents. Responders must be knowledgeable (trained) of what 
multidisciplinary agencies capabilities are. Allred stressed the procedures could be a valuable 
resource or template for local, state, and federal agencies in responding to other incidents.  
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In the collapse of the I-35 Bridge (USFA, 2007) details of the actual response of multiple 
agencies around a multijurisdictional incident can be scaled when prior training, 
communications, and shareholder buy in has occurred. Minneapolis Fire Chief Jim Clack 
indicated that the past exercises and planning had worked (USFA, 2007). This one response 
involved at least 75 state, local and federal agencies. Everyone could communicate with each 
other within a new interoperable radio system (USFA, 2007).     
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Approach 
 
 I sought to establish a link between law enforcement historical use of critical-incident 
management collaborations both in practice and in training and current practices by Sheriffs’ 
Offices in North Carolina. The approach was to document historical use and implementation of 
various Incident Command System/Incident Management Systems, identify techniques and 
employ related joint task-force and collaborative recommendations through the literature review. 
This study examined the extent to which cooperation and training exists with regard to managing 
and preparing for major planned exercises and responding to unforeseen critical-incidents 
involving multiple agencies on a state and local scale, specifically in all 100 North Carolina 
Sheriff’s offices. In addition, the researcher determined the extent to which these various 
agencies collaborated on scheduled cross-training projects, primarily designed for multi-agency, 
multi-disciplinary responses from neighboring local jurisdictions in response to critical-
incidents.   
 
Survey Development 
 
 A survey designed specifically for this study was used (See Appendix A) to gather 
information directly from all Sheriffs’ Offices in North Carolina. The survey was developed 
through the reoccurring issues contained within the literature review. Training, collaboration 
among neighboring first responder agencies and common shared communications   were 
identified as factors in the successful implementation and mitigation of actual events that 
occurred. As Cardwell and Clooney (2000) suggested, agencies that actively disseminate and 
encourage in-house proactive training are better prepared to respond to foreseeable incidents that 
have a high probability of occurrence. Also discussed were the positive outcomes of agencies 
that solicited other disciplines and neighboring jurisdictions to participate in training exercises 
designed to mitigate incidents prior to an actual incident that had regional implications, I-35 
Bridge Collapse (EMR-ISAC). The literature review identified as another concern within the 
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inability to communicate within an incident. Common communications is one of the foundation 
tenants of ICS (Cardwell & Clooney, 2000). Actual debriefings from agencies that have 
experienced a multiagency critical-incident stressed the essential requirement of interoperable 
communications in mitigation and management of a multiagency response (Rohen, 2001). The 
survey (See Appendix A) was developed using these themes of proactive training, mandated 
training, hours of training, topics, ICS exercises, actual events or incidents that have occurred, 
intra-agency and multi-disciplinary cooperation within joint training exercises. The focus was on 
qualitative and quantitative data both, with a strong emphasis on establishing examples through 
quantitative data, and suggesting policy and other initiatives through qualitative data. Questions 
were formatted from historical events, after action reports, and training debriefings. 
 
Data Gathering Method 
  
Data were gathered in this survey through direct telephone contact of all North Carolina’s 
100 Sheriff’s offices. Initially, all telephone calls were made to either the Chief Deputy or the 
Chief of Operations within each Sheriff’s Office. These individuals were identified from a 2008 
North Carolina Sheriff’s Directory (North Carolina Sheriffs’ Association, 2009). During some of 
the conversations with the Chief Deputy or Chief of Operations they would refer the questions 
from the survey to be answered to other individuals assigned to a training division or other 
member from administration. Of the 100 sheriffs’ offices contacted, 83 (83%) responded. At 
least 5 attempts were made (and logged) to sheriff’s offices that did not return calls. The focus 
was on both qualitative and quantitative data. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
The following strategies for data analysis were completed for the survey questions. 
Frequency distributions were collected and studied. Specific attention was given to qualitative 
responses provided, especially with agencies that had participated in multiagency training or 
have experienced a multi-level critical-incident; sheriffs’ office training hours were compared 
with the county population density, the region of the state the Sheriff’s Office was located, and 
size of the law enforcement agency by using chi-square tests.    
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 The following strategies were used to answer the stated research questions: 
Research Question #1: How many Sheriffs’ Offices complete more training than the 
North Carolina Sheriffs’ Training & Standards Division requires? To answer this question, 
frequency counts and percentages were calculated for survey items related to the type of format 
(survey questions #3 and #5). 
Research Question #2: Is there a difference between agency size (sworn officers 
employed, survey question #3), county population (survey question #1), region of the state i.e., 
Mountains, Piedmont, and Coastal Plain, in requiring additional departmentally mandated 
training hours?  In answering this question, the respondent agencies were placed into three 
classifications according to the number of sworn officers employed; small less than 50 sworn 
officers, medium between 50 and 100 officers, and large, more than 100 officers. This 
classification was obtained through the 2009 U.S. Department of Labor, Law Enforcement 
Agencies Classification Index (USDOL, 2009). All Sheriffs’ Offices were coded within their 
specific regions of North Carolina (Mountains, Piedmont, or Coastal Plain) as defined by the 
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI, 2009). Classifications of County Size 
were as follows; small, less than 40,000 in population, medium, between 40,000 and 80,000 and 
large, over 80,000 in population. Three cross tabulated tables were created one for each of the 
following independent variables: (a) agency size (small, medium, and large); (b) population 
within each county; and (c) region. The dependent variable was whether the county exceeded the 
24 hours of state mandated law enforcement in-service training. The following hypotheses were 
tested with the chi-square test with alpha set at .05: 
 
H021: There is no difference among small, medium, and large sheriffs’ offices that 
exceeded the State mandated training hours. 
H022: There is no difference among county populations and sheriffs’ offices that 
exceeded the State mandated training hours. 
H023: There is no difference in region of North Carolina sheriffs’ offices that exceeded 
the State’s mandated Training hours. 
 
Research Question #3:  Is there a difference between agencies that have had a 
multiagency exercise and increased training hour requirement and agencies that only met North 
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Carolina training minimums and have not participated in a multiagency exercise? In answering 
this question frequency counts, percentages and chi-square tests were calculated for survey items 
related to the type of format. 
Research Question #4: Is there a difference between agencies that have experienced a 
multiagency response incident with increased training hour requirement and agencies that have 
met only North Carolina training minimums and have not experienced a multiagency response?  
Again, as with research question #3 frequency counts and percentages and chi-square tests were 
calculated for survey items related to the type of format. 
Research Question #5: Of the agencies that participate in an annual Incident Management 
Exercise what were problems encountered within those exercises? To answer this question a 
coding sheet was developed to interpret the qualitative data (Problems with Communication, 
Training or lack of training, and Organization or Management of the exercise). 
Research Question #6: Of the agencies that have experienced a multiagency critical-
incident in the last 12 months what were problems encountered within those responses? This 
question was answered by developing a coding sheet to interpret all qualitative data (Problems 
with Communications, Organization or Management of the incident, and Training). 
 
Summary 
  
Chapter 3 consisted of the approach, survey development, data-gathering method, data 
analysis, and a list of research questions and null hypotheses that were used for this study. 
Chapter 4 presents the findings of the data analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
 
  The purpose of this study was to address the extent to which various local law 
enforcement agencies, specifically all North Carolina Sheriff’s offices, work together on cross-
training projects primarily with neighboring law enforcement agencies’ response to critical-
incidents. The goals of this research are to identify the dynamics that interplay between agency 
cooperation in incident management and law enforcement; to determine what is being done to 
enhance the public’s security; to determine, perhaps more importantly, what is not being done; 
and to address recommendations for the future via data analysis and the presentation of this 
document. 
The population examined in this study consisted of all 100 Sheriffs’ Offices in North 
Carolina. In preparing for this study a spreadsheet was designed to identify all Chief Deputies’ or 
Operations Commanders in each of the 100 Sheriffs’ Offices. The survey was designed to be 
administered via telephone to all commanders throughout the state. The responses were recorded 
on this spreadsheet for data analysis. All 100 county Sheriffs’ Offices were contacted; however, 
only 83 agencies participated in this survey. These 83 agencies were grouped initially into the 
three geographic regions of North Carolina (See Table 1).  Sheriffs’ Offices in the Mountain 
region responded more frequently than Sheriffs’ Offices in Piedmont or Coastal Plain regions. 
However, this overrepresentation was likely due to chance. This was demonstrated by applying a 
chi-square test (X² (2) = .331, p =.85).  
   
Table 1 
Respondent Agencies in North Carolina (by Region) 
Region Respondent 
Sheriffs’ Offices 
Total Counties in 
Region 
Percentage of Respondents 
in Region 
Coastal Plain 21 27 77.8 
Piedmont 39 49 79.6 
Mountains 23 24 95.8 
Total  83 100   
 
Respondent agencies were then classified into size of the Sheriff’ Office. Office size was 
deemed to be small if it had fewer than 50 sworn officers; medium if the agency had between 50 
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and 100 sworn officers, and finally large if the Sheriff’s Office employed more than 100 sworn 
officers (See Table 2). This classification was developed from the 2009 U.S. Department of 
Labor, Law Enforcement Agencies Classification Index (USDOL, 2009). When compared to the 
100 Sheriffs’ Offices in North Carolina medium sized offices were underrepresented. However, 
by applying a chi-square test (X² (2) = .345, p =.84) this was not significant.   
 
Table 2  
Frequency Distribution of North Carolina Sheriffs’ Office Size 
Category Respondent 
Sheriffs’ Offices 
Total Sheriffs’ Offices 
in North Carolina 
Relative frequency 
per Respondents (%) 
Large 22 23 26.5 
Medium 29 38 34.9 
Small 
Totals 
32 
83 
39 
100 
38.5 
 
Sheriffs’ Offices were then grouped by county population into three classifications; Small 
if the population was less than 40,000; Medium if the population was between 40,000-80,000 
and Large if the population exceeded 80,000 (See Table 3). This distribution was developed by 
using the range of populations of the 83 respondents; small counties were the lower third of the 
range, medium counties were the middle third and finally, large counties were the upper third of 
the range. Smaller counties were underrepresented within the respondent Sheriff s’ Offices.  
Respondent counties were compared with the classification of all North Carolina counties by 
applying a chi-square test comparing the two distributions and was found to be insignificant (X² 
(2) = .216, p =.90).   
 
Table 3 
Frequency Distribution of North Carolina County Size by Population 
Category Respondent 
Sheriffs’ Offices 
Total Sheriffs’ Offices 
in North Carolina 
Relative frequency 
per Respondents (%) 
Large 29 32 34.9 
Medium 24 29 28.9 
Small 
Totals 
30 
83 
39 
100 
36.1 
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Analysis of the Research Questions 
 
Surveys were administered by telephone to gather the data presented in the study. This 
section is organized based on the order of the research questions presented in Chapters 1 and 3. 
 
Research Question #1  
How many Sheriffs’ Offices complete more training than the North Carolina Sheriffs’ 
Training & Standards Division requires? 
To answer this question, frequency counts and percentages were calculated for survey 
items related to the type of format. Of the 83 Sheriffs’ Offices that responded, 52 agencies 
(62.8%) indicated they require more training than the 24 hours North Carolina Sheriffs’ Training 
& Standards Division requires per year (See Table 4).  Of these 52 responding agencies, most 
significant were 14 agencies that require 32 hours of training (27% of the 52 respondents). Seven 
agencies require 40 hours of training per year (13.5%) . One agency reported requiring 100 hours 
of training and two agencies reported requiring 104 hours per year of mandated in-service 
training.   
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Table 4 
Frequency and Number of Training Hours Required by North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices 
Number of 
Sheriffs’ Offices 
Hours of 
Annual In-service 
Mandated per 
Officer 
Relative 
Frequency per 
Category (%) 
2 104  3.8 
1  100  1.9 
1  72  1.9 
1  70  1.9 
1  66  1.9 
1  64  1.9 
3  60  5.8 
1  52  1.9 
1  50  1.9 
5  48  9.6 
1  44  1.9 
2  42  3.8 
7  40  13.5 
5  36  9.6 
14  32  27.0 
1  30  1.9 
5 
Total      52 
28  9.6 
 
Research Question 2 
Is there a difference between Sheriff’s Office size (Sworn officers employed), county 
population, or region of the state (Mountains, Piedmont, and Coastal Plain) in requiring 
additional departmentally mandated training hours?  The range of sworn officers within the 52 
Sheriff’s offices that required more than the minimal training varied from 11 to 356 officers 
(mean = 71). The 52 Offices were classified by the number of sworn officers employed (Small = 
<50, Medium = 50-100, and Large = 100>).  
Nineteen (36.5%) of the 52 Sheriff’s offices were classified as large (See Table 5), in 
comparision, only 26.5% of the 83 survey respondents were classified as large. Twenty agencies 
(38.5%) were classified as medium as compared to 34.9% of the survey respondents. Finally, 
Thirteen (25%) agencies were classified as small in comparsion to 38.5% of the survey 
respondents. 
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 Table 5 
52 Sheriffs’ Offices Size by Sworn Officers Employed 
Category Frequency per 
category 
Relative frequency 
per category (%) 
Large 19 36.5 
Medium 20 38.5 
Small 
Total 
13 
52 
25.0 
 
When compared to the 31 agencies that do not require additional training only 3 Sheriff’s offices 
(9.7%) were classified as large. Eleven Sheriff’s offices were classified as medium (35.5%) and 
the majority of Sheriff’s offices that do not require additional training were classified as small, 
17 Sheriff’s offices (54.8%) (See Table 6). 
 
Table 6 
31 Sheriffs’ Offices Size by Sworn Officers Employed 
Category Frequency per 
category 
Relative frequency 
per category (%) 
Large 3 9.7 
Medium 11 35.5 
Small 
Total 
17 
31 
54.8 
 
In order to determine whether or not the observed sample was representative of the 83 
respondents within the population, two single-sample chi-square tests were conducted to 
compare the proportions of the respondents from the Small, Medium, and Large Sheriffs’ Offices 
in the survey to the 52 agencies that exceeded the mandated inservice training. There was no 
significant difference between the observed sample (52 agencies) and that of the 83 respondents 
relating to the size of the agency (X² (2) = 2.32, p =.31). A chi-square test was used to determine 
if there was a significant difference between the size of Sheriff’s offices that required additional 
training and the 31 Sheriff’s offices that did not (X² (2) = 10.1, p < .05) . There was a significant 
difference among the 31 Sheriff’s offices that do not require additional training. It is likely the 
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smaller the Sheriff’s Office the less likely it would engage in additional training beyond what 
North Carolina mandates. The null hypothesis was rejected. 
The counties were then coded into population categories of small, population of less than 
40,000, medium population between 40,000 and 80,000, and large with population of 80,000+.  
Twenty-two (42.3%) counties were classified as large (population over 80,000) of the 52 
counties as compared to twenty-nine (34.9%) of the 83 survey respondents classified as large. 
Fourteen (26.9%) counties were classified as medium as opposed to twenty-four (29%) of survey 
respondents.  Sixteen (30.8%) counties were coded as small as compared to thirty (36.1%) of the 
survey counties. In order to determine whether or not the observed sample was representative of 
the 83 respondents within the population, two single-sample chi-square tests were conducted to 
compare the proportions of the respondents from the Small, Medium, and Large Counties based 
on population in the survey to the 52 agencies that exceeded the mandated in-service training. 
There was no significant difference between the observed sample (52 agencies) and that of the 
83 agencies relating to the size of the county (X² (2) = 3.43, p =.18). Comparison between the 52 
Sheriff’s offices (See Table 8), requiring additional training and the 31 Sheriff’s offices (See 
Table 7) that require only North Carolina minimums was completed by using a chi-square test 
with alpha set at .05 (X² (2) = 3.47, p =.17). The null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
Table 7 
31 North Carolina Sheriffs’Offices of County Population Size (Minimum Training Only) 
County Size 
(Population) 
Frequency per 
category 
Relative frequency per 
category (%) 
Large 7 22.6 
Medium 10 32.2 
Small 
Total 
14 
31 
45.2 
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Table 8 
52 North Carolina Sheriffs’Offices of County Population Size (Additional Training Only) 
County Size 
(Population) 
Frequency per 
category 
Relative frequency per 
category (%) 
Large 22 42.3 
Medium 14 26.9 
Small 
Total 
16 
52 
30.8 
 
In order to determine whether or not the observed sample was representative of the 83 
respondents within the population, two single-sample chi-square tests were conducted to 
compare the proportions of the respondents from the Coastal, Piedmont, and Mountain regions of 
the state to the 52 agencies that exceeded the mandated in-service training). There was no 
significant difference between the observed sample (52 agencies) and that of the 83 respondents’ 
relating to the region of the state (X² (2) =.149, p = .93). Of the 52 agencies mandating additional 
training thirteen (25%) counties were located in North Carolina’s Coastal Plain as compared to 
twenty-one (25%) of the survey respondents. Thirteen (25%) counties were from the Mountain 
region as compared to twenty-three (27.7%) from the survey. Twenty-six (50%) counties were 
from the Piedmont region as compared to thirty-nine (47%) from the survey counties (See Table 
9). Compared to the 83 respondents, the 52 agencies mirror the distribution from specific regions 
within North Carolina.  
 
Table 9 
52 North Carolina Sheriff’s offices within Region (Additional Training) 
Region 
of N.C. 
Frequency per 
category 
Relative frequency per 
category (%) 
Coastal 13 25 
Piedmont 26 50 
Mountains 
Total 
13 
52 
25 
 
There was no significant difference among the regions of the state as to whether or not Sheriff’s 
offices required additional training when compared to the 31 Sheriff’s offices that only complied 
with North Carolina’s minimum training requirement (X² (2) = .643, p = .73). The null 
hypothesis was retained (See Table 10).  
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Table 10 
31 North Carolina Sheriffs’Offices within Region  (Minimum Training Only) 
Region 
of N.C. 
Frequency per 
category 
Relative frequency per 
category (%) 
Coastal 8 25.8 
Piedmont 13 42 
Mountains 
Total 
10 
31 
32.2 
 
Research Question 3 
Is there a difference between agencies that have had a multiagency exercise and increased 
training hour requirement and agencies that only met North Carolina training minimum and have 
not participated in a multiagency exercise? Forty (76.9%) of the 52 agencies indicated they 
participate in at least one annual critical-incident, multiagency exercise (See Table 11). When 
compared with the 31 agencies that only require North Carolina minimum standards in training 
hours that have participated in a multiagency exercise (See Table 12) Eighteen (58.1%) Sheriffs’ 
Offices conducted or participated in an annual Critical-incident Exercise. Thirteen (41.9%) 
agencies that require state minimums in training hours did not participate in any exercises.  
 
Table 11 
52 North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices Requiring Additional Training 
Annual 
Multiagency 
Exercise  
Frequency per 
category 
Relative frequency per 
category (%) 
No 12 23.1 
Yes 
Total 
40 
52 
76.9 
 
Table 12 
31 North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices requiring only State Minimum Training 
Annual 
Multiagency 
Exercise 
Frequency per 
category 
Relative frequency per 
category (%) 
No 13 41.9 
Yes 
Total 
18 
31 
58.1 
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 A comparison was completed using a chi-square test between the 52 Sheriff’s offices that require 
additional training and the 31 Offices that only comply with North Carolina minimum standards. 
No significant difference was detected between the two distributions (X² (1) = 3.28, p = .07).  
 
Research Question 4 
Is there a difference between agencies that have experienced a multiagency response 
incident with increased training hour requirement and agencies that have met only North 
Carolina training minimum and have not experienced a multiagency response? Twenty-five 
(48.1%) of the 52 agencies responded they have had a Critical-incident involving a multiagency 
response (See Table 13) as opposed to 27 agencies that have not experienced an multiagency 
response incident. In comparing the 52 agencies to the 31 agencies that only require state 
minimum in training hours, only 12 agencies (38.7%) had experienced a multiagency incident 
(X² (1) = .69, p = .41). The majority of agencies, nineteen (61.3%) did not experience such an 
incident (See Table 14). A difference was observed between the two distributions. Sheriff’s 
offices that did not experience a multiagency incident were more likely to train officers within 
the North Carolina minimum standard requirements. 
 
Table 13 
52 North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices Requiring Additional Training 
Multiagency 
Incident 
Frequency per 
category 
Relative frequency per 
category (%) 
No 27 51.9 
Yes 
Total 
25 
52 
48.1 
 
Table 14 
31 North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices Requiring Only State Minimum Training 
Multiagency 
Incident 
Frequency per 
category 
Relative frequency per 
category (%) 
No 19 61.3 
Yes 
Total 
12 
31 
38.7 
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Research Question 5 
Of the agencies that participate in an annual Multiagency Exercise what were problems 
encountered within those exercises? The responses from all 83 respondents were coded from 
answers provided. Forty agencies (from the 52 agencies requiring more training hours) and 18 
agencies (from the 31 agencies that only complete state minimum training hours) stated they had 
completed annual multiagency training exercises. All responses from these agencies were placed 
into one of three groups:  
 
1) Communications Problems- uncommon radio frequencies or the inability to monitor 
other first responder agencies radio traffic.  
2)  Organizational Problems- the exercise was too large and relied heavily on the 
administration (paperwork) and only limited input from field officers. Shareholder 
buy in was not observed from all first responder agencies. The exercise was not based 
in reality (improper planning).  
3) Training Problems- the inability to train, because of time, funding or support. Law 
enforcement was placed within a support role during most of these multiagency 
exercises. The inability for law enforcement agency to fund discipline specific 
scenarios.    
 
Fifty-three (63.9%) of the 83 respondents indicated they had no issues with the exercise or the 
question did not apply because the agency had not participated in an annual exercise (See Table 
15).  
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Table 15 
Annual Multiagency Exercise Problems Coded 
Identified Multiagency Exercise 
Problems 
Number of Sheriffs’ 
Offices 
Relative Frequency 
per Category (%) 
 
Communications Problems 
 
Organizational Problems 
 
Training Problems 
 
Not Applicable 
 
Total 
 
14 
 
8 
 
8 
 
53 
 
83 
 
16.9 
 
9.6 
 
9.6 
 
63.9 
 
Fourteen agencies (16.9%) reported communication problems. Two of the 14 agencies 
reported having multiple problems with communications as well as training concerns; however, 
communication was the first priority. Eleven of the 14 agencies reported the major problem with 
communications was the lack of interoperability (common frequency and radio band range for 
all responders) and the need for additional transceiver units within each county was mentioned as 
a problem in allowing more first responder entities communicating between each other during 
exercises and incidents. 
The next category was organization. Eight agencies (9.6%) reported issues with the 
organization before, during and after the exercises. Comments from these agencies varied from 
not having enough shareholder participation from agencies in the planning and implementation 
stages to the exercises were too technical, too large and relied too heavily on managing 
administrative aspects of the exercise itself. Additional comments concerned the realistic nature 
of the exercise they had experienced and wanted a more practicable exercise identified to be 
implemented.  
The final category, Training, was reported by eight agencies (9.6%) to be of concern. 
Agencies indicated they lacked the supplemental funding required to design and implement their 
own exercises and had to rely on other first responder agencies to provide funding. Interestingly 
of the 83 respondents only 4 agencies (4.8%) had access to external funding (survey question 
#7). Two agencies had Department of Homeland Security grants for specific teams training, one 
agency had a Bureau of Justice grant that required local matching funds from another first 
62 
 
responder agency to design, implement and evaluate for one single, very specific and highly 
restrictive exercise (McGuire Nuclear Station) and the last agency relied on funding from the 
Emergency Medical Service in that county for the exercise.  Additional comments identified the 
size and scope of the exercise and the degree of law enforcement involvement during the 
training. Essentially law enforcement served as support personnel during mass casualty scenarios 
or other medical related training events.   
 
Research Question 6 
Of the agencies that have experienced a multiagency critical-incident what were 
problems encountered within those responses? The responses from all 83 respondents were 
coded from answers provided in the survey. Of the 83 respondents, Sixty-three (75.9%) indicated 
they had no issues with the incident or the agencies have not had a multiagency response within 
the last 12 months (See Table 16). 
 
Table 16 
Multiagency Incident Problems Coded 
Identified Multiagency Incident 
Problems 
Number of Sheriffs’ 
Offices 
Relative Frequency 
per Category (%) 
 
Communications Problems 
 
Communication-Organization 
 
Organizational Problems 
 
Training Problems 
 
Training-Communication 
 
Not Applicable 
 
Total 
 
10 
 
6 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
63 
 
83 
 
12.0 
 
7.2 
 
1.2 
 
2.4 
 
1.2 
 
75.9 
   
 
Ten agencies (12.05%) had problems with communications, again as with answers from 
research question #5, interoperability and not enough transceivers for everyone to use was the 
main concern from postincident debriefings (See Table 16). Six agencies (7.2%) had both 
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communications and organizational issues. Two of these cited communication interoperability 
and their agencies inexperience with working with outside disciplines during the actual critical-
incident (Emergency Medical Service and Emergency Management). One agency responded 
with organizational issues in that it was almost three hours into the incident before critical staff 
was present “on-scene” to advise and make proper notifications and requests for additional 
resources. The final three agencies had both Training (2 agencies) and a combination of Training 
and Communication issues (1 agency). Two agencies reported their officers were functioning in 
roles they were not trained for.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Summary 
The purpose of this study was to determine North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices work 
together on cross-training projects primarily within neighboring local jurisdictions’ response to 
critical-incidents. The goal of this research was to identify the dynamics that interplay between 
law enforcement agency cooperation and incident management; to determine what is being done 
to enhance the public’s security; to determine, perhaps more importantly, what is not being done; 
and to address recommendations for the future data analysis and the presentation of a template 
for future cooperation, cross-training efforts and future grant applications designed to mitigate 
the cost of implementation of such a program. This section presents a review of the results of the 
data and interpretation of the statistical results of the survey located in Appendix A. The survey 
statements were analyzed using quantitative and qualitative methods using descriptive and 
inferential statistics. Six research questions were analyzed for the purpose of this study. 
 
Research Questions 
Research Question #1 
Research question #1 focused on how many Sheriffs’ Offices completed more training 
than the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Training & Standards Division requires? North Carolina 
requires 24 hours of in-service training for the year 2009. The survey results showed that of the 
83 respondents 52 Sheriffs’ Offices required more than 24 hours of in-service mandated by the 
North Carolina Sheriffs’ Training and Standards Division in the calendar year 2009. Of those 52 
Offices several patterns emerged;  
1) Fourteen (27%) of the Sheriff’s offices required 32 hours of training per year. 
2) Seven (13.5 %) required 40 hours of in-service training per year. 
3) There were three groups of five (9.6% each) Sheriff’s offices requiring 28, 36, and 48 
hours of training per year. 
4) Two (3.8%) Sheriff’s offices required 104 hours per year in training. 
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Research Question #2 
  Research question #2 focused on whether there was a difference between Sheriff’s Office 
size (sworn officers employed, survey question #3), county population (survey question #1), 
region of the state i.e., Mountains, Piedmont, and Coastal Plain, in requiring additional 
departmentally mandated training hours?   
The 52 Sheriff’s offices that had higher training requirements were grouped into 
classifications of large, medium, and small dependent on how many sworn officers each had.  Of 
the 52 Sheriff’s offices, nineteen (36.5%) were classified as large this compared to the 83 
agencies in the survey population that only contained twenty-two (26.5%) offices. Twenty 
Sheriff’s offices (38.5%) of the 52 were classified as medium as compared to twenty-nine 
(34.9%) of the 83 survey respondents. Thirteen (25%) Sheriff’s offices of the 52 were classified 
as small compared to thirty-two (38.5%) offices classified as small from the 83 survey 
respondents. There was a significant difference among the 31 Sheriff’s offices that do not require 
additional training (X² (2) = 10.1, p < .05). The null hypothesis was rejected. From the data 
presented it would be more likely for a larger agency to exceed the state’s training requirement 
rather than a smaller one. 
 North Carolina counties were classified by population into small (under 40,000), medium 
(40,000-80,000), and large (over 80,000) counties. The 100 Sheriff’s Offices in North Carolina 
were classified by size into the following; 32 large agencies, 29 medium agencies, and 39 small 
agencies. Of the 52 agencies that exceeded the state mandated 24 in-service hours 22 (42.3%) 
were classified as large compared to 7 (22.6%) agencies from the 31 Sheriff’s Offices that only 
required state training minimums.  Fourteen counties (26.9%) were classified as medium 
compared to 10 (32.2%) from the 31 Sheriff’s Offices that only require state minimums.  Sixteen 
counties (30.8%) were coded as small as compared to 14 counties (45.2%) from the 31 Sheriff’s 
Offices requiring state minimums. There was no significant difference between the observed 52 
Sheriff’s offices that required more training in comparison to the 31 Sheriff’s offices that met 
North Carolina minimums pertaining to the county population (X² (2) = 3.47, p = .17). The null 
hypothesis could not be rejected. 
 The third segment of this question focused on if there was a difference between the 
region an agency was in and increased training requirement? All North Carolina counties were 
coded into their various regions as listed by the North Carolina Department of Instruction 
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(Mountains, Piedmont, and Coastal Plain). In comparing the 31 Sheriff’s offices that met only 
North Carolina minimums with the 52 Sheriffs’ Offices that exceeded minimum standards (X² 
(2) = .643, p = .73) the null hypothesis could not be rejected.  
 
Research Question #3  
Is there a difference between agencies that have had a multiagency exercise and increased 
training hour requirement and agencies that only met North Carolina training minimums and had 
not participated in a multiagency exercise? Forty (76.9%) of the 52 agencies indicated they had 
participated in at least one annual critical-incident, multiagency exercise as compared to eighteen 
(58.1%) of the 31 Sheriff’s offices that met only North Carolina minimum standards. This 
comparison resulting in chi-square (X² (1) = 3.28, p = .07) demonstrated a slight increase within 
the frequency distribution of the number of agencies engaging in an annual multiagency training 
exercise and mandating increased training requirements beyond the state minimum requirements. 
 
Research Question #4 
Is there a difference between agencies that have experienced a multiagency response 
incident with increased training hour requirement and agencies that have met only North 
Carolina training minimums and had not experienced a multiagency response? Twenty-five 
(48.1%) of the 52 agencies responded they have had a multiagency incident as compared to 
twelve (38.7%) of the 31 Sheriffs’ Offices that complied with the state’s minimum standards (X² 
(1) = .69, p = .41). The frequency distribution demonstrated an increase in the number of 
Sheriffs’ Offices that had encountered a multiagency incident and required increased training 
within their department.   
 
Research Question #5 
In research question #5 the focus was on agencies that participate in an annual Incident 
Management Exercise what were problems encountered within those exercises? Fourteen 
(16.87%) of the 83 survey respondents indicated the major problem identified from postexercise 
debriefing was communications. Respondents indicated they had no common frequency between 
all responders participating within the exercise or enough radio transceivers to give out to all 
responders. Eight agencies (9.6%) reported concerns with the organization of the exercise in 
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timing, realism, and management during the event. Eight agencies (9.6%) also indicated training 
was a factor. Comments ranged from lack of training, no funding for training, no equipment for 
training, scenarios designed and used were unrealistic, and training did not include enough 
disciplines.   
 
Research Question #6 
Research question #6 asked of the agencies that have experienced a multiagency critical-
incident in the last 12 months what were problems the agencies experienced? Of the 83 
respondents, 63 (75.9%) indicated they had no issues with the incident or have not had a 
multiagency response within the last 12 months.  As with research question #5, the major 
problem reported from agencies that have experienced a multiagency response, 10 agencies 
(12.05%) reported communications as being the major problem. Six agencies (7.23%) reported a 
combination of communication and organization as the problem in mitigating the incident at 
hand. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The following conclusions were made based on the analysis of the study’s findings: 
1. Of the 83 survey respondents, 52 (62.8%) Sheriffs’ Offices required more than the 24 
hours mandated by the North Carolina Sheriffs’ Training and Standards Division. 
From those 52 Sheriff’s offices clear patterns emerged regarding the additional hours 
of training each agency mandated, 27% of the offices required 32 hours of annual 
training and 7.5% required 40 hours of annual training. The study’s findings indicate 
more than half of the 83 respondents required more training than North Carolina 
mandates per year. 
2. North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices pertaining to sworn officer strength were classified 
as small, medium, and large departments. The data indicate larger Sheriff’s offices 
are engaging in more training than smaller departments. The geographic region 
(Mountains, Piedmont, or Coastal Plain) was found not to be a factor between 
agencies requiring additional training and agencies that only met state minimums.   
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3. An increase in training was measured within agencies that had an annual multiagency 
exercise and increased training requirement (52 Sheriff’s offices) compared to the 31 
Sheriff’s offices that only required North Carolina minimum standards (76.9% 
compared to 58.1%).   
4. An increase in training was also visible within agencies that had experienced a 
multiagency incident and required increased training when compared to the Sheriff’s 
offices that met state minimum standards (48.1% compared to 38.7%). 
5. Problems encountered during multiagency exercises from all 83 survey respondents 
were comparatively common. The largest group (16.87%) reported communication 
issues during the exercises. Eight agencies (9.6%) reported having problems with the 
organization of the exercise. Comments included lack of realism, timing (lack of 
adequate time to complete the exercise), and management of the exercise itself. Eight 
agencies (9.6%) indicated training (or lack of training) as a major factor in the 
exercises. Comments from lack of training, little or no funding for training and the 
lack of various extraneous disciplines during the exercises, namely utilities, janitorial 
staff, and public works. 
6. Problems with communication was the predominate issue with agencies that have 
experienced a multiagency incident followed by agencies having combined issues 
with communications and organization during the incident.  
 
Recommendations for Practice 
 
1. Multiagency training married with preplanned, well organized, and realistic 
scenarios, benefits all agencies within a jurisdiction. Agencies should invest heavily 
in identifying probable incidents that could occur within their respective counties and 
solicit nontraditional shareholders to participate in these well-managed events. 
2. Given the 30 problems identified from Sheriffs’ Offices that have experienced a 
multiagency exercise and the 20 problems identified by Sheriffs’ Offices that 
responded to a multiagency incident, law enforcement agencies should concentrate on 
mitigating three issues with a high probability of occurrence found within this study; 
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interoperable communications, management or organization of the incident, training 
or a lack of training, or finally a combination of all three. 
3. This study found that only 4 out of 83 agencies had access to external grant funding. 
Additional research should focus on targeting avenues of support from federal, state 
and nontraditional sources (foundation and private businesses). The lack of funding is 
a major barrier to designing, planning, implementing, and evaluating future training. 
Funding is required for agencies with smaller staffing to use their strained resources 
more effectively. External funding could provide access to specific communications 
equipment necessary for interoperable continuity across disciplines as well.  
 
Recommendations for Further Research 
  
The findings revealed that most North Carolina Sheriffs’ Offices exceed the minimum 
required hours of training. Further study should also be conducted to determine exactly what 
specific topics or subject matter these agencies are requiring. Additional research of this type 
should be focused in other states to observe if any patterns can be replicated.  
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APPENDENICES 
Appendix A 
Interview Protocol 
 
“Hello, my name is Major Greg Minton, with the Wilkes County Sheriff’s Office. I am 
calling you to see if you would mind answering some questions concerning critical response 
management and training your agency participates in? This will only take a few minutes of your 
time. 
Question #1: County Population? 
Question #2: Number of Agency Employees (sworn officers)? 
Question #3: The number of required training hours per year your agency requires? 
Question #4: Does your agency mandate cross-training (multi-disciplinary) with other 
first responder entities 
Question #5: The number of mandated training hours required by North Carolina and 
your agency per year? 
Question #6: Has your agency ever cross-trained with any other first responder agency? 
Question #7: Are there any grants or other sources of funding for ICS or NIMS training? 
Question #8: Does your agency participate in at least one Incident Management exercise 
per year? 
Question #9: (If Q6 yes) How many agencies participated in these exercise(s)? 
Question #10: Which agency was in charge/control of the exercise(s)? 
Question #11: What were some of the problems identified during the/these exercise(s)? 
Question #12: What were some of the possible solutions identified? 
Question #13: Has your agency ever experienced an actual ICS incident? 
Question #14: How many agencies participated during this/these incident(s)? 
Question #15: Were there any problems encountered in these incidents? 
Question #16: Other remarks. 
Thank you for your participation”. 
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Appendix B 
Survey Record 
County  Alamance  Alexander  Alleghany  Anson 
Region  P  iedmont Piedmont  M  ountain Piedmont 
County 
Population  142,661  33,603  10,677  25,275 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
125  25  12  25 
AGENCY SIZE  Large  Small  Small  Small 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
36  24  32  24 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
Alamance 
Community 
College 
coordinates 
our in‐service 
training 
SRT team only Yes/ one day Training Event/ Rapid Shooter  occasionally 
Agency 
participate in 
at least one 
yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
The whole 
county 
participates in 
a massive 
exercise once 
per year 
Sheriff & 
Taylorsville 
Police 
EMS/Hospital/Fire/City/Blue 
Ridge Pwkay  8 
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 County  Alamance  Alexander  Alleghany  Anson 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
Emergency 
Management, 
Fire Marshall, 
and SO 
Police 
Department  EMS 
Emergency 
Management 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
Communications  Unknown  None  normal chaos 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
COMM  N/A  N/A  ORGAN 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
more money for 
communications 
equipment 
Unknown  N/A  Evacuations 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  N/A 
6 or 8 months 
ago Barricaded 
Subject 
Yes/ Search lost 
person  locally 
INCIDENT  NO  YES  YES  NO 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A   N/A  Every 2 to 3 months  N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
N/A  3 Catawba/SHP 
Rescue Squad/ 
Fire/SHP/Sheriff/ 
Wilkes/EM 
N/A 
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 County  Ashe  Avery  Beaufort  Bertie 
Region  M  ountain M  ountain Coastal  Coastal 
County 
Population  27,372  17,946  44,958  19,773 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
23  23  55  24 
AGENCY SIZE  Small  Small  Medium  Small 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
24  24  48  24 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
No  occasionally  occasionally  None 
Agency 
participate in 
at least one 
yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
3 LE, Fire, EM 
and EMS  N/A  4  4 
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 County  Ashe  Avery  Beaufort  Bertie 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
Emergency 
Management  N/A 
Community 
College  SO 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
INCIDENT  NO  NO  NO  NO 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
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 County  Bertie  Bladen  Buncombe  Burke 
Region  Coastal  Coastal  M  ountain M  ountain
County 
Population  19,773  32,278  217,531  92,000 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
24  60  239  104 
AGENCY SIZE  Small  Medium  Large  Large 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  Yes  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
24  70  36  24 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
None 
It Varies from 
Subject 
Matter, Rapid 
Deployment, 
NIMS, 
Defensive 
Driving with 
other LE 
agencies 
Yes/Dependant on Teams  Yes 
Agency 
participate in 
at least one 
yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  No  Yes  No 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
4  N/A  Jackson County Tabletop 8 agencies/ Tactical  In County 
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 County  Bertie  Bladen  Buncombe  Burke 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
SO  N/A  Regional Board  SO 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
N/A  N/A  None  Communications 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  COMM 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
N/A  N/A  None  Unknown 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  N/A 
Leak at the 
Dupont Plant 
(Mass Event)  
No  No 
INCIDENT  NO  YES  NO  NO 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A 
Emergency 
Manager had quit 
and we had to 
pick it up, little or 
no relief, lack of 
communication 
and coordination 
w/I the incident 
N/A  Communications 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  COMM AND ORGAN  N/A  COMM 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
N/A 
5 Sheriff’s offices, 
Numerous other 
local LE agencies, 
and Support 
Agencies 
N/A  5 
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 County  Cabarrus  Caldwell  Camden  Carteret 
Region  P  iedmont M  ountain C  oastal Coastal 
County 
Population  157,176  78,664  9,600  63,511 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
235  60  17  40 
AGENCY SIZE  Large  Medium  Small  Small 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
50  32  24  24 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
Firearms, 
Bloodborne 
and HazMat 
Yes  None  Yes SRT Teams 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  Yes  No  No 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
Terrorist 
Threat inside 
a Mall all 
first 
responder 
agencies 
attended 
Fire/EMS/Emergency 
Management/Sheriff/Granite 
Falls, Another LE 
N/A  N/A 
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 County  Cabarrus  Caldwell  Camden  Carteret 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
Emergency 
Management  Sheriff  N/A  N/A 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
Communications  Communications  N/A  N/A 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
COMM  COMM  N/A  N/A 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
More Viper 
Radios 
More 
Infrastructure  N/A  N/A 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  N/A  Yes 
two (plane 
crash) and 
Large wild land 
fire 
N/A 
INCIDENT  NO  YES  YES  NO 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A  Coordination and Communication 
Money and 
Resources 
needed 
N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  COMM AND ORGAN  TRAINING  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
N/A 
2 Major LE 
Agencies Lenoir 
PD and Sheriff 
SHP, EMS, DOT, 
NC Fire  0 
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 County  Caswell  Catawba  Chatham  Cherokee 
Region  Piedmont  P  iedmont Piedmont  M  ountain
County 
Population  23,501  154,000  60,000  24,298 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
36  128  85  25 
AGENCY SIZE  Small  Large  Medium  Small 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
28  72  28  24 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
SERT  STAR Team/Multi agency SWAT  None 
Yes 
Multiagency 
response to 
Active 
Shooter in 
Schools 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
No  No  Yes  Yes 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
N/A  N/A  Harris Nuclear  Plant Exercise 
3 LE, Fire, 
EM and 
EMS 
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 County  Caswell  Catawba  Chatham  Cherokee 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
N/A  Sheriff  Emergency Management 
Emergency 
Management 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
N/A  Communications  Communications 
Only complete 
training once per 
year 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  COMM  COMM  TRAINING 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
N/A  More Viper Radios  None  More Training 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident? 
Yes Missing 
Person/Numerous 
Agencies 
Boatapaluza 
(lake Norman)  N/A 
Yes/Bomb 
Threats in two 
high schools 
INCIDENT  YES  YES  NO  YES 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
Communications 
None, 20 
agencies 
represented 
Comm. worked 
great 
N/A   Communications and Organization 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
COMM  N/A  N/A  COMM AND ORGAN 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
EM/2 Fire Depts  20 LE agencies  10 Fire/EMS/LE  4 LE with Fire, EM and EMS 
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 County  Chowan  Clay  Cleveland  Craven 
Region  Coastal  M n ountai Piedmont  Coastal 
County 
Population  14,526  9,876  99,032  94,875 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
17  13  86  60 
AGENCY SIZE  Small  Small  Medium  Medium 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
104  40  60  24 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
SWAT  occasionally 
Rapid Deployment 
Training, 1 week of 
additional Sheriff's 
Choice 
None 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
No  No  Yes  No 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
N/A  N/A 
Other agencies are 
welcome to 
participate in all of 
our training 
N/A 
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 County  Chowan  Clay  Cleveland  Craven 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
N/A  N/A  Emergency Management  N/A 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
N/A  N/A  table top only  N/A 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  ORGAN  N/A 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  N/A  Yes  Meth labs  N/A 
INCIDENT  NO  YES  YES  NO 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A  Coordination and Communication 
All agencies in 
the county are 
on the state 
viper system 
(excellent) 
N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  COMM AND ORGAN  N/A  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
N/A  4 LE  4 usually, SO, SBI,   N/A 
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 County  Cumberland  Currituck  Dare  Davidson 
Region  P  iedmont Coastal  Coastal  P  iedmont
County 
Population  302,963  23,500  40,000  147,246 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
350  67  56  131 
AGENCY SIZE  Large  Medium  Medium  Large 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
48  32  52  42 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
Infrequently  None 
All training is 
inhouse and is 
open to other 
agencies 
18 hours of 
Firearms/ 
Cross Train 
with 
Lexington 
PD (SRT 
Teams only) 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
Varies year 
to year on 
subject 
matter 
Sheriff/EM/Fire/other LE 
Sheriff, Marine 
Fisheries, State 
Parks and other 
Agencies 
participate 
NIMS with 
the 
Emergency 
Management 
Division 
(Active 
Shooter) 
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 County  Cumberland  Currituck  Dare  Davidson 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
EM  EM  Sheriff  Emergency Manager 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
Communications  Communications  None  Notification of Training 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
COMM  COMM  N/A  ORGAN 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
More Radios  More Radios  N/A  More advance Notification 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident? 
Barricaded 
Subject  N/A 
Storms all of 
them require a 
multiple agency 
response 
Lexington PD 
Officer Down 4 
LE agencies in 
the county 
INCIDENT  YES  NO  YES  YES 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
Communications  N/A  N/A  None 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
COMM  N/A  N/A  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
2 LE, Fire, EMS  N/A  More than 10 LE   All 4 in Davidson County 
92 
 
 County  Davie  Duplin  Durham  Ed egecomb  
Region  Piedmont  Coastal  P  iedmont Coastal 
County 
Population  40,035  53,843  246,896  55,606 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
50  85  168  54 
AGENCY SIZE  Medium  Medium  Large  Medium 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  Yes  Yes  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
24  104  32  24 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
No 
Rapid Deployment, Active 
Shooter and other LE 
responses 
BLET Academy 
through the Sheriff 
Training 
Center Open 
for other 
agencies 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
All County 
First 
Responders 
Table top Plane Crash into a 
school for mass injuries 
17 universities and 
all County PDs 
Rapid 
Deployment 
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 County  Davie  Duplin  Durham  Edgecombe 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
Emergency 
Management 
Emergency 
Management 
NCCU, Director 
of Public Safety 
of the NC System 
Sheriff 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
N/A  N/A  None  Tactics new to older officers 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  TRAINING 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
N/A  N/A  N/A  More Training 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  N/A  N/A 
Bomb 
Team/Sheriffs 
Emergency 
Response Team 
SERT 
No 
INCIDENT  NO  NO  YES  NO 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
N/A  N/A  Sheriff, PD, NCSBI  N/A 
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 County  Forsyth  Franklin  Gaston  Gates 
Region  P  iedmont Piedmont  P  iedmont Coastal 
County 
Population  306,607  55,100  202,535  13,154 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
257  56  115  11 
AGENCY SIZE  Large  Medium  Large  Small 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
60  64  40  36 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
Both Forsyth 
and Winston 
PD work the 
Coliseum  
occasionally 
Specialized Teams 
Bomb, Regional 
Tactical 
K‐9 training 
with Rocky 
Mount PD 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
Winston‐
Salem, 
Kernersville, 
and Forsyth 
participated 
in a ICE 
storm event 
N/A   N/A 
2 Chowan 
County SO 
and Gates SO
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 County  Forsyth  Franklin  Gaston  Gates 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
Emergency 
Management 
Emergency 
Management  None  Andy Bunch EM 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
People not using 
proper forms and 
submission of 
proper paperwork
Less Organized 
Not using 
Incident 
Management in 
every situation 
N/A  N/A 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
ORGAN  ORGAN  N/A  N/A 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
More training and 
non‐reliance on 
technology 
N/A  More Viper Radios  N/A 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  Weather related  N/A 
Barricaded 
Mental Subject  N/A 
INCIDENT  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
everything went 
real well except 
for 
communications 
N/A  Communications  N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
COMM  N/A  COMM  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
Everybody from 
the Feds Down 
(all county LE 
agencies 
represented) 
N/A 
2 LE, Emergency 
Management, 
Fire and EMS 
N/A 
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 County  Graham  Granville  Greene  Guilford 
Region  M  ountain Piedmont  Piedmont  P  iedmont
County 
Population  12,000  55,500  20,000  433,000 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
12  49  28  247 
AGENCY SIZE  Small  Small  Small  Large 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
28  24  24  48 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
occasionally  occasionally  Only through the community College 
Only 
Specialized 
Units 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
No  Yes  No  Yes 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
N/A  7 LE agencies, Fire, EMS  N/A  5 LE  
97 
 
 County  Graham  Granville  Greene  Guilford 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
N/A 
Emergency 
Management, 
Brian Short 
N/A  National Guard 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
N/A  N/A  N/A  Only The National Guard 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  ORGAN 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
N/A  N/A  N/A  Unknown 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Barricaded 
Subject 
INCIDENT  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A  N/A  N/A  None  
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
N/A  N/A  N/A  6 total, 2 LE and 4 support 
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 County  Halifax  Harnett  Haywood  Henderson 
Region  Piedmont  P  iedmont M  ountain M  ountain
County 
Population  54,242  106,283  54,033  102,367 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
65  101  53  55 
AGENCY SIZE  Medium  Large  Medium  Medium 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
24  42  24  32 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
No  Domestic Violence, Sims training  Yes 
Rapid 
Deployment 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
Rapid 
Deployment, 
all In house 
SO and Sanford PD 
Tunnel Collapse SO, 
PD, Fire, EMS, and 
Emergency 
Management 
N/A 
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 County  Halifax  Harnett  Haywood  Henderson 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
SO  SO  Emergency Management  N/A 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
N/A 
The training 
needs to be as 
realistic as 
possible 
None  N/A 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  TRAINING  N/A  N/A 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
N/A 
more planning 
involved in the 
role play  
N/A  N/A 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  Weather related 
Car Chase with 
multiple agencies 
with an armed 
bank ber  rob
I‐40 Rock Slide  N/A 
INCIDENT  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A 
could not stop 
the suspect 
vehicle 
N/A  N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  ORGAN  N/A  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
SHP, PD, and all 
surrounding LE 
agencies 
4 LE agencies 
All County first 
responders took 
shifts until 
Interstate was 
cleared 
N/A 
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 County  Hertford  Hoke  Iredell  Jackson 
Region  Coastal  Piedmont  P  iedmont M  ountain
County 
Population  22,604  41,016  146,206  36,500 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
23  64  120  55 
AGENCY SIZE  Small  Medium  Large  Medium 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
32  28  24  32 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
None  Yes  Just have started 
Only when 
we train 
through the 
Community 
College 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
Active 
Shooter 
Active Shooter High School 
SHP, SO, EMS 
McGuire Nuke 
Plant Exercise 5 
Counties with all 
Local Jurisdictions 
within those 
N/A 
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 County  Hertford  Hoke  Iredell  Jackson 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
Open to all 
Agencies  SO  NRC  N/A 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
Communications  Unknown  Manpower (lack Of)  N/A 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
COMM  N/A  ORGAN  N/A 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
Better Training 
and more Like 
Frequency use 
N/A 
More Bodies 
during the 
training 
N/A 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  N/A  N/A 
Officer Involved 
Shooting with 
Statesville PD 
and Three other 
agencies all LE 
SBI, Wilkes and 
PD a HP nd S
Yes, Apartment 
complex fire  
INCIDENT  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A  N/A 
Communications 
and lack of 
implementation 
of NIMS  
N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  COMM AND ORGAN  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
N/A  N/A  4 LE Total 
All Fire, Police, 
EMS and Rescue 
within the 
County 
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 County  Johnston  Jones  Lee  Lincoln 
Region  P  iedmont Coastal  Piedmont  Piedmont 
County 
Population  166,843  10,500  60,107  70,914 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
93  13  50  95 
AGENCY SIZE  Medium  Small  Medium  Medium 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  Yes 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
24  24  48  24 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
Specialized 
Units, 
Tactical and 
Swift Water 
Rescue 
None 
Additional In‐
Service Driver 
Training, 
Bloodborne and 
Hazmat 
Rapid 
Deployment 
with Anti‐
Terrorism 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  No  No  No 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
2 LE, Fire, 
EMS & 
Emergency 
Management 
N/A  N/A  N/A 
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 County  Johnston  Jones  Lee  Lincoln 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
SO  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
Communications  N/A  N/A  N/A 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
COMM  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
None  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Yes, Student with 
a gun at high 
school 
INCIDENT  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
N/A  N/A  N/A  Everybody 
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 County  Macon  Martin  McDowell  M gecklenbur
Region  M  ountain Coastal  M  ountain P  iedmont
County 
Population  31,200  25,593  42,151  902,803 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
46  34  45  350 
AGENCY SIZE  Small  Small  Small  Large 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  Yes  Yes 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
32  24  40  66 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
Firearms and 
Drivers 
Training 
enhancement  
No  Rapid Response 
Yes, 
Independent 
Training 
Academy 
with Char. 
Mech. Police 
Department 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
No  Yes  Yes  No 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
N/A  15 or 16 agencies 4 LE (3 County Event)  2 LE  N/A 
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 County  Macon  Martin  McDowell  Mecklenburg 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
N/A  Emergency Management  SO  N/A 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
N/A  None  Not enough Training funding  N/A 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  TRAINING  N/A 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
N/A  N/A  More Funding  N/A 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  N/A 
Missing Persons 
and Homicides  Jail Escape  No 
INCIDENT  NO  YES  YES  NO 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A  Communications  Communications  N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  COMM  COMM  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
N/A  13 counties w/I DPR 
All State and 
Local in County  N/A 
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 County  Mitchell  M yontgomer   Moore  Nash 
Region  M  ountain Piedmont  Piedmont  Piedmont 
County 
Population  15,850  28,262  83,000  90,710 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
13  37  75  76 
AGENCY SIZE  Small  Small  Medium  Medium 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  Yes  No  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
24  32  32  24 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
Community 
College  Legal Policy Updates 
Specific Duty 
Required 
Yes Job 
specific 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
Community 
College 
(Mayland) 
Rapid Deployment 4 LE 
agencies  5 or 6 LE agencies 
Rapid 
Deployment 
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 County  Mitchell  Montgomery  Moore  Nash 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
LE coordinator  SO  Emergency Management  SO 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
None  None  None  Communications 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  COMM 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
N/A  N/A  N/A  Viper 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident? 
Armed Individual 
streets of Spruce 
Pine 
No  Nursing Home Shooting  None 
INCIDENT  YES  NO  YES  NO 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
None  No  None  N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
SO, Spruce Pine, 
SHP  N/A 
6 LE agencies 
Responded  N/A 
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 County  New Hanover  Onslow  Orange  Pamlico 
Region  Coastal  Coastal  P  iedmont Coastal 
County 
Population  184,120  175,000  140,000  13,900 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
320  118  130  14 
AGENCY SIZE  Large  Large  Large  Small 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  Yes 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
40  32  100  40 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
Through the 
Community 
College 
Team Specific 
Varies from Min to 
over 100 per 
officer 
Rapid 
Deployment 
Training 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
ICS, Weather, 
Jail Evac, Flu 
Mass Service 
Mctiffer Training, w/ 
Multiple Agency 
Table Top 
/University of 
North Carolina 
Fire, EMS, LE 
Active Shooter 
Rapid 
Deployment 
5 LE 
agencies 
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 County  New Hanover  Onslow  Orange  Pamlico 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
Chief Hines, SO  Jacksonville PD 
UNC Police 
Department Col. 
Hare  
SO 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
Money, Lack of/ 
Dedicated 
Equipment 
(computer, 
infrastructure) 
Communications 
Not Broad 
enough‐Other 
Disciplines 
(Utilities, 
Maintenance) 
and 
Communications 
Communications 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
TRAINING  COMM  ORGAN  COMM 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
Dedicated 
Equipment for the 
Event 
Everyone needs 
to be on the same 
frequency 
More Training 
and 
standardized 
Communications 
Gave all LE 
Radios in other 
Agencies 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident? 
Hurricanes, 
Missing Persons, 
Major Crimes 
Task‐Forces 
None 
UNC Campus 
Suspect Drove 
Vehicle through 
Pitt/ Active 
Shooter in 
School 
Active Shooter in 
School 
INCIDENT  YES  NO  YES  YES 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
Practice, Practice, 
Practice  None 
Training, 
Communications, 
Media Relations 
(Chapel Hill 
Police) Kevin 
Gunter Excellent 
Use of PIO 
None great 
response times 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
TRAINING  N/A  TRAINING  AND COMM  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
7 agencies all LE  N/A 
5 LE Unknown 
number of 
Support 
Agencies 
4 LE agencies 
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 County  Pender  Perquimans  Person  Pitt 
Region  Coastal  Coastal  Piedmont  Coastal 
County 
Population  48,000  11,368  35,623  152,068 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
80  11  42  138 
AGENCY SIZE  Medium  Small  Small  Large 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  Yes  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
28  24  60  48 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
Yes  None  Min to 50 to 60 Hours  
Just 
beginning to 
coordinate 
all law 
enforcement 
agencies in 
the county 
for active 
shooter  
training 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
Rapid 
Deployment/ 
Tabletop 
Exercise 
N/A  Active Shooter in Schools 
Pitt County 
SO, Craven 
County SO, 
New Bern 
PD, SHP, 
Wildlife 
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 County  Pender  Perquimans  Person  Pitt 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
SO and 
Emergency 
Management 
N/A  Emergency Management  
Emergency 
Management 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
N/A  N/A  Need more training  None 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  TRAINING  N/A 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
N/A  N/A 
More Training all 
officers are NIMS 
certified and 
more 
communications 
N/A 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  Fumes in School  N/A  No  N/A 
INCIDENT  YES  NO  NO  NO 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
None  N/A  N/A  N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
HazMat, EM, Fire  N/A  N/A  N/A 
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 County  Polk  Robeson  Rockingham  Rowan 
Region  M  ountain P  iedmont Piedmont  P  iedmont
County 
Population  18,866  129,931  91,928  136,254 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
22  136  110  131 
AGENCY SIZE  Small  Large  Large  Large 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
32  36  30  24 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
Yes  Yes, Our classes are open to all LE 
Taser 
Recertification  No 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  Yes  No  No 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
Response to 
Critical‐
incidents 
(Roadway 
Spill‐ 
HAZMAT) 
Yes, Rapid Deployment with 
HAZMAT option  N/A  N/A 
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 County  Polk  Robeson  Rockingham  Rowan 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
Emergency 
Management  SO  N/A  N/A 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
None  None  N/A  N/A 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  N/A 
multi homicide 
case with 
numerous LE 
agencies  
Search  
Nothing that we 
did not handle 
internally 
INCIDENT  NO  YES  YES  NO 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
N/A  N/A  10 agencies  N/A 
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 County  Rutherford  Stokes  Surry  Swain 
Region  M  ountain Piedmont  M  ountain M  ountain
County 
Population  65,000  46,168  73,000  13,445 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
60  40  68  17 
AGENCY SIZE  Medium  Small  Medium  Small 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
40  24  32  24 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
Yes, Driver 
Training 
with other 
LE agencies 
SWAT Training w special 
units 
Tazer Training 
with other LE 
agencies 
Incident 
Management 
and Active 
Shooter 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
Training 
with Polk 
County SO 
Active 
Shooter 
Active Shooter with all 
County Police in a High 
School  
Active Shooter, or 
the Hospital Mass 
Critical‐incident 
(hostage event) 
N/A 
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 County  Rutherford  Stokes  Surry  Swain 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
Emergency 
Management  SO 
Emergency 
Management  N/A 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
Not Realistic 
Senarios   Unknown  More Training  N/A 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
TRAINING  N/A  TRAINING  N/A 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
More Training  Unknown  Need More Training  N/A 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  No 
Officer Shot/ at 
least 30 LE 
agencies 
represented 
N/A  No 
INCIDENT  NO  YES  NO  NO 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A  Communications  N/A  N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  COMM  N/A  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
N/A  30 LE agencies  N/A  N/A 
116 
 
 County  T aransylvani   Vance  Wake  Watauga 
Region  M  ountain Piedmont  P  iedmont M  ountain
County 
Population  29,334  45,000  866,410  42,695 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
55  44  356  42 
AGENCY SIZE  Medium  Medium  Large  Medium 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  No  Yes 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
44  32  36  24 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
Firearms, 
Legal 
Updates 
Specialized Teams, K‐9 only 
Training Center is 
open to all Law 
Enforcement 
Agencies 
Rapid 
Deployment 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
Bio hazard 
Event 
Active Shooter Exercise at 
High School with 7 LE 
agencies 
N/A 
Haz Mat 
Event, 
Boone, ASU, 
Fire, SO, NC 
National 
Guard, 
Emergency 
Management
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 County  Transylvania  Vance  Wake  Watauga 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
Emergency 
Management 
Emergency 
Management 
Brian Short 252‐
438‐8264 
N/A  Emergency Management 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  N/A  N/A  No  No 
INCIDENT  NO  NO  NO  NO 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
118 
 
 County  Wayne  Wilkes  Wilson  Yancey 
Region  P  iedmont M  ountain Piedmont  M  ountain
County 
Population  130,000  66,492  78,224  18,421 
Number of 
Agency 
Employees 
(Sworn 
Officers) 
85  72  70  14 
AGENCY SIZE  Medium  Medium  Medium  Small 
Cross­
Training 
Mandated 
with other 
agencies? 
No  No  Yes  No 
Hours of 
Mandated 
Training? 
(Within 
Agency) 
24  24  40  24 
Cross­
Training 
Completed 
with other 
agencies? 
Wilson Tech 
or Costal 
Plain 
Community 
College 
Special Teams Tactical, 
Bomb Only 
Driver Training, 
Rapid Deployment 
each year 
Through the 
Community 
College 
(Mayland) 
Agency 
participate 
in at least 
one yearly 
Critical­
incident 
Exercise?  
Yes  No  Yes  No 
How Many 
Agencies 
Participated 
in Exercise? 
Orbit Comet 
Seymore 
Johnson AFB, 
Goldsboro 
PD, 
Emergency 
Management 
N/A 
Wilson PD, 
Stantonburg PD, 
Black Creek PD, 
Johnston County 
Sheriff Sharpsburg 
PD & Emergency 
Management 
N/A 
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 County  Wayne  Wilkes  Wilson  Yancey 
Agency in 
Charge of 
Coordination? 
Air Force  N/A  Emergency Management  N/A 
Identified 
Problems 
Encountered 
with Exercises 
(Post­Exercise 
Analysis)  
None  N/A 
Communications, 
not one 
jurisdiction is on 
the same 
frequency band 
N/A 
EXERCISE 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  N/A  COMM  N/A 
Possible 
Solutions to 
Identified 
Problems 
N/A  N/A 
More Training 
and a universal 
radio system for 
all county 
agencies 
N/A 
Has Agency had 
an ICS Incident?  None 
Yes, Lost 
Individuals, 
hostage situation, 
Wild land fires  
Plane Crash, 7 
agencies 
involved 
Floods, large 
structure fires 
INCIDENT  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Identified 
Problems with 
ICS Incident 
(Post­Incident 
Analysis) 
N/A  Communications 
Communications, 
and 
jurisdictional 
problems 
Communications 
INCIDENT 
PROBLEM 
CODED 
N/A  COMM  COMM AND ORGAN  COMM 
How Many 
Agencies were 
Involved? 
N/A 
At least 3 LE 
agencies, 
mulitple EMS, 
Fire Departments 
& Emergency 
Management 
3 LE (SO, City 
and SHP) EM and 
3 Fire 
Departments 
All first 
responder 
agencies in the 
County as well as 
the State and 
National Guard 
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